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ABSTRACT 
  
This thesis examines three reactions to the Vietnam War—Neoconservatism, the Abrams 
Doctrine, and the War Powers Resolution—and argues that those reactions have shaped 
America‟s foreign policy agenda in the last fifty years.  Beginning with the 1964 Gulf of Tonkin 
Resolution, exploring the Reagan era and its interventions in Grenada and Latin America, and 
ending in the mid-1990s, this thesis traces the politics of war in the United States since Vietnam 
and argues that the culmination of these three reactions during the George H.W. Bush presidency 
has resulted in the subsequent direction of the country‟s objectives abroad.   
  
1 
  
INTRODUCTION 
In February 2015, President Barack Obama sent a letter to Congress asking for an 
authorization to use military force to fight the extremist group ISIS.  The letter‟s language was 
very clear that there would be no “enduring ground assaults” and that there was a time limit to 
the war: three years.
1
  The request from President Obama received mixed reception among 
Congressional officials.  Senator Richard Blumenthal (D-CT), a member of the Armed Services 
Committee, said that he had “great reservations.”  West Virginia Senator Joe Manchin (D-WV) 
argued, “If money or military might would change that part of the world, we‟d be done a long 
time ago.”  Not all, however, criticized the President‟s approach.  Senator Jeff Flake (R-AZ), 
member of the Foreign Relations Committee, noted that although he hardly ever agreed with 
President Obama, “. . . [I]n this instance, we need an Authorization to Use Military Force.”2   
Besides signaling that the United States was, once again, seeking to intervene 
significantly in the Middle East, the letter was also a sign that the powers of war as outlined by 
the U.S. Constitution were being followed.  Article I, Section 8, Clause 11, which vests the 
power of war with the Legislature, was invoked when President Obama asked the Congress to 
make a decision about a reengagement in the Persian Gulf.  It was the first time since George W. 
Bush‟s Global War on Terror initiative in 2001, and subsequent War in Iraq, that Congress had 
been asked for an authorization to use military force.  What is important about President 
Obama‟s letter and George W. Bush‟s authorization in 2001, however, is that seeking 
Congressional authority in order to wage war had been virtually ignored in the previous four 
decades of American foreign policy.  This thesis outlines and adds historical context to the 
                                                 
1. Jeremy W. Peters, “Obama to Seek War Power Bill from Congress, to Fight ISIS,” New York Times, 
February 10, 2015.   
 
2. Peters, “Obama to Seek.” 
2 
  
politics surrounding the previous fifty years of U.S. military engagements, while arguing that 
three reactions to the Vietnam War—the Neoconservative Movement, the Abrams Doctrine, and 
the War Powers Resolution—culminated in the post-Vietnam era and permanently affected U.S. 
foreign policy directives.  Tracing each of these reactions from their inception in the 1970s 
through the George H.W. Bush Administration, this thesis maintains that while two reactions to 
Vietnam (the Abrams Doctrine and the War Powers Resolution) lost their potency, the third 
remained a strong, influential force in the politics of war.   
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
When President Johnson decided to increase military presence in Vietnam in 1965, he 
sought to do so in a way that would cause as little disruption to the American people as possible.  
One of the results of this plan was that Johnson resolved not to activate the National Guard and 
Reserves.  Many of Johnson‟s constituents in Washington had sons who served in the Guard and 
Reserves, and Johnson became nervous about the political ramifications a call-up might entail.
3
  
Arguing that the activation would be too dramatic, Johnson, instead, filled the fighting force with 
draftees, most of whom came from lower-socioeconomic backgrounds and less affluent parents.
4
   
Johnson‟s decision not to activate the Reserves had one consequence that directly shaped 
the way the American people were involved in the war—it disrupted the lives of those not 
serving minimally.  Johnson‟s logic on this was sound: when Reservists are not called to active 
duty, they are often influential, integral parts of their communities.  Johnson, believing that a 
                                                 
3. Michael Beschloss, Reaching for Glory: Lyndon Johnson’s Secret White House Tapes, 1964-1965 (New 
York: Simon and Schuster, 2002), 409-410.  
 
4. According to the National Vietnam Veterans Foundation, 76% of those drafted were from low 
socioeconomic backgrounds, with only 23% having parents in professional positions. “Facts about the Vietnam 
War,” National Vietnam Veterans Foundation, accessed November 20, 2014, 
http://nationalvietnamveteransfoundation.org/facts.html.  Christian Appy‟s book demonstrates the extent to which 
working class Americans contributed far more to the war than those from the upper class, in Christian Appy, 
Working-Class War: American Combat Soldiers in Vietnam (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1993). 
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call-up of the Reserves would be politically detrimental, decided to reduce the war‟s effects 
within the general population by augmenting active forces with draftees.
5
  Johnson‟s decision, 
made out of political necessity, soon had unintended consequences.   
Those serving in the war felt as if the American people had abandoned them, that the war 
was not affecting the general population, and that the government had burdened them, not the 
country, with war.
6
  The morale of the military was shattered as a result of this feeling.  And 
because of that sense of abandonment among soldiers, General Creighton Abrams, commander 
of the forces in Vietnam from 1968 to 1972, proposed a restructuring of the U.S. Army to ensure 
that the military would never again go to war, while the civilian population remained virtually 
unaffected.  His antidote was the Abrams Doctrine.  
As Chief of Staff of the Army in 1972, Abrams restructured the Army‟s divisions in order 
to interweave Reservists into primary support functions.  What Abrams‟s restructuring 
effectively did was ensure that when the U.S. military went to war, the Reserves had to come 
along, and by extension so did the American people.  Forcing Presidents to disrupt the lives of 
Reservists and their families—pulling them out of their jobs, ripping influential community 
members from their communities, asking the sons of powerful constituents to serve—Abrams 
made the decision to go to war more precarious, more intimidating, and more debate-invoking.
 7
 
                                                 
5. According to the National Vietnam Veterans Foundation, 76% of those drafted were from low 
socioeconomic backgrounds, with 23% having parents in professional positions. “Facts about the Vietnam War,” 
National Vietnam Veterans Foundation, accessed November 20, 2014, 
http://nationalvietnamveteransfoundation.org/facts.html.  Christian Appy‟s book, Working-Class War, demonstrates 
the extent to which working class Americans contributed far more to the war than those from the upper class.  
Christian Appy, Working-Class War: American Combat Soldiers in Vietnam (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1993). 
 
6. Jim Webb, Fields of Fire (New York: Random House Publishing, 1981), 174.   
 
7. Lewis Sorley, “Creighton Abrams and the Active-Reserve Integration in Wartime,” Parameters 21, no.2 
(Summer 1991): 35-50. 
 
4 
  
The Abrams Doctrine remained largely moot in the Reagan era, simply because the 
military engagements Reagan oversaw did not entail the Vietnam-era call-ups the Abrams 
Doctrine sought to prevent.  In the George H.W. Bush Administration, the Abrams Doctrine was 
adhered to during the First Gulf War, with 180,000 Reservists serving in the conflict.  With that 
conflict, however, the counter to Abrams Doctrine was formulated: military privatization.  Then 
Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney proposed augmenting U.S. forces with contractors.
8
  In effect, 
the Reservists, who had served in key support functions, would no longer be needed.  The idea of 
private contracts gained momentum in the Clinton Administration, and by the 2000s, accounted 
for over half of the Pentagon‟s budget.9  It was out of the same Abrams Doctrine sentiment of 
“never again will there be an ill-conceived, poorly executed war like Vietnam” that Congress 
sought to reestablish itself as the war-making branch of government.   
The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, passed in August 1964, had been the impetus for 
Presidents Johnson and Nixon to wage war in Southeast Asia.  After the disastrous results of 
Vietnam and presidents waging war on their own accord for nearly a decade, Congress passed 
the War Powers Resolution Act of 1973.  In it, Congress reasserted its preeminence on issues of 
war, and attempted to sharply curtail a president‟s ability to wage war without its approval.10  
Though replete with built-in loopholes, the War Powers Resolution was Congress‟s first step in 
trying to reign in presidential prerogative on foreign policy directives.   
During the Reagan Administration, the War Powers Resolution would see its greatest 
challenges as Reagan engaged in military operations in Grenada, Latin America, and Lebanon.  
                                                 
8. Washington Post, quoted in Homer Duncan, Bush and Cheney’s War: A War Without Justification 
(Bloomington: Traddford Publishing, 2006), 5. 
 
9. See Figure 3-3.  
 
10. “A Joint Resolution Concerning the War Powers of Congress and the President,” P.L. 93-148, 93rd 
Congress, 2nd sess., 1973. 
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The George H.W. Bush Administration was bound to the War Powers Resolution by the sheer 
size of the First Gulf War; in short, the number of troops requested by the military commanders 
for the intervention in the Persian Gulf inarguably needed Congressional approval.  While the 
War Powers Resolution and the Abrams Doctrine attempted to impede on a president‟s ability to 
wage war, the third reaction to Vietnam outlined in this thesis, Neoconservatism, would spend 
the next decades arguing against its contemporaries.   
The Neoconservative Movement arose in direct opposition to the anti-war movement 
surrounding Vietnam.  Disgusted by what they saw as the unpatriotic peace movement, 
Neoconservatives advocated for the United States to stay the course in Vietnam and implement 
American democracy in the region.
11
  By the end of the war, Neoconservatives gained the 
reputation for being pro-military intervention during a time in which that sentiment was no 
longer accepted by the mainstream.  After the fall of Saigon in 1975, Neoconservatives 
continued to promote the idea of American exceptionalism, and eventually found a niche in the 
Reagan Administration‟s anti-Communist fervor.   
Gaining prominent positions within the Reagan Administration, Neoconservatives 
championed Reagan‟s increased military spending, anti-Communist position, and the reassertion 
of America‟s military superiority.  It was during the Reagan Administration‟s interventions in 
Grenada, Latin America, and Lebanon, and its development of the arms-for-hostages tradeoff 
known as the Iran-Contra Scandal, that Neoconservatives began to realize their goals of 
reshaping the world through military force.  As Reagan‟s shirking of Congressional approval 
during his military excursions saw success, Neoconservatives continued to advocate presidential 
prerogative in the next administration, while serving in more prominent roles.   
                                                 
11. Gary Dorrien, The Neoconservative Mind: Politics, Culture, and the War of Ideology, (Philadelphia: 
Temple University Press, 1993), 1. 
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George H.W. Bush, Reagan‟s Vice President, filled his administration with many familiar 
Neoconservative faces, like Dick Cheney and Paul Wolfowitz.  Saddam Hussein‟s invasion of 
Kuwait in 1990 was the first true test for Neoconservative ideas, which argued that Bush needed 
Congress‟s support, not its approval.  The War Powers Resolution was adhered to and the 
Abrams Doctrine was employed, but the overwhelming success of the U.S. military in the First 
Gulf War added credence to Neoconservative ideal that America could implement change 
through military might.  The Regional Defense Strategy, which accompanied the First Gulf War, 
authored by Neoconservatives Dick Cheney and Paul Wolfowitz, set the precedent for America‟s 
next decade of foreign policy.
12
  For all intents and purposes, the George H.W. Bush 
Administration saw the culmination of the three reactions to Vietnam, all of which were as 
prevalent in the 1990s as they had been in the 1970s at their inception.   
HISTORIOGRAPHY 
The scope of this thesis is directly related to political pundit Rachel Maddow‟s book, 
Drift: The Unmooring of American Military Power.  In her book, Maddow argues that the United 
States has lived in a perpetual state of warfare in the past fifty years, the result of presidents 
progressively gaining more power since the Johnson Administration.  While Maddow‟s work 
was an invaluable source for this thesis, she ignores an important aspect to the argument: 
Neoconservatism.  Maddow‟s assertion that the evolution of presidential powers is a natural 
process, passed on by each successive administration, misses a larger element in American 
politics.  Neoconservatives, who have arguably held more prominent, powerful foreign policy 
positions during war time than any other political persuasion in the last fifty years, have 
permanently shaped America‟s international objectives, alongside its Vietnam counterparts.  
                                                 
12. Department of Defense, “Defense Strategy for the 1990s: The Regional Defense Strategy,” January 
1993 
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While agreeing with Maddow‟s conclusions, this thesis utilizes more primary sources than 
Maddow‟s work, gives historical context to the overall argument, refines her major arguments to 
be more explicit, and adds a deeply needed facet to fully understand the politics of the post-
Vietnam era.   
The New York Times archive provided most of the articles and quotes regarding 
politicians‟ views on the events outlined in the chapters.  Historian Sean Wilentz‟s book, The 
Age of Reagan, provided insight to the political atmosphere in the 1980s, while helping to 
contextualize why the Age of Reagan is an integral part American politics and the overall 
politics of war.
13
  Wilentz‟s assertion that Ronald Reagan truly ushered in a new era in American 
politics is substantiated in what follows.  Historian Lewis Sorley‟s works on General Creighton 
Abrams, culminating in his book, Thunderbolt, provided the relevant information about what 
General Abrams sought to accomplish with his restructuring of the Army.
14
  Agreeing with 
Sorley‟s argument on the reasons behind Abrams‟s restructuring, this thesis adds the differing, 
yet related sentiments within the American consciousness during the 1970s.   
Neoconservatism is a hotly contested topic within the academic community, with two 
schools of thought on its inception, one claiming it comes from domestic disagreements, while 
others maintain it is a foreign policy-driven ideology.  Examining works on both theses was 
essential to understand which argument is more credible.  Social ethicist Gary Dorrien‟s The 
Neoconservative Mind was especially helpful in wading through the differing points of view on 
the topic, while helping to shape the argument of this thesis.
15
  In addition to Dorrien, other 
                                                 
13. Sean Wilentz, The Age of Reagan: A History, 1974-2008 (New York: Harper Collins, 2008). 
 
14. Lewis Sorley, Thunderbolt: General Creighton Abrams and the Army of His Time (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 2008). 
 
15. Gary Dorrien, The Neoconservative Mind: Politics, Culture, and the War of Ideology (Philadelphia: 
Temple University Press, 1993). 
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secondary sources on the topic were consulted, like political scientist James Kurth‟s “The 
Neoconservatives are History,” and historian David Noon‟s “Cold War Revival: 
Neoconservatives and Historical Memory in the War on Terror.”16  The Father of 
Neoconservatism, Irving Kristol‟s memoir Reflections of a Neoconservative helped to 
substantiate the claims made in secondary sources about the ideology‟s views and goals.17 
Sources surrounding the War Powers Resolution are generally primary sources, such as 
legislative bills, resolutions, interviews, and newspaper articles.  Biographies were consulted, 
like Colin Powell My American Journey, George H.W. Bush‟s All the Best, and Dick Cheney‟s 
In My Time.
18
  The papers of public figures and congressional hearings helped to build the 
primary source material of the thesis.   
Examining the intersection of three reactions to the Vietnam War—Neoconservatism, the 
Abrams Doctrine, and the War Powers Resolution—and how they have affected U.S. foreign 
policy for the last few decades is the question this thesis seeks to answer, and an important 
question to answer in overall U.S. political history.  Arguing that the Abrams Doctrine and War 
Powers Resolution have lost their viability in the post-Vietnam era because of the political 
constraints of war, this thesis maintains that of the three reactions, Neoconservatism has made 
the most lasting impact on the United States‟ foreign policy agenda since Vietnam.    
  
                                                 
16. James Kurth, “The Neoconservatives are History,” Orbis 50, no. 4 (2006): 756-769. David Hoogland 
Noon, “Cold War Revival: Neoconservatives and Historical Memory in the War on Terror,” American Studies 
Journal 48, no. 3 (2007): 75-99. 
 
17. Irving Kristol, Reflections of a Neoconservative: Looking Back, Looking Ahead (New York: Basic 
Books, Inc., 1983).   
 
18. Colin Powell, My American Journey (New York: Random House Publishing, 1995).  George H.W. 
Bush, All the Best: My Life in Letters and Other Writings (New York: Simon and Schuster, Inc., 2013).  Dick 
Cheney, In My Time: A Personal and Political Memoir (New York: Simon and Schuster, Inc., 2011).   
9 
  
CHAPTER ONE 
NEOCONSERVATISM, THE ABRAMS DOCTRINE AND PRESIDENTIAL 
PREROGATIVE 
INTRODUCTION 
. . . [I]t is a fact that if you have the kind of power we now have, either you will 
find opportunities to use it, or the world will discover them for you.
 19
 
  --Irving Kristol, Father of Neoconservatism, The Weekly Standard 
The Vietnam era in the United States was filled with uncertainty: uncertainty regarding 
America‟s global status, military strategies, and politics.  It had become clear that the United 
States had spent over a decade in Southeast Asia fighting an unwinnable war.  While many 
Americans were calling for an end to the war, Neoconservatives, who opposed that idea, called 
for the United States to remain steadfast in its cause.  Arguing that the U.S. withdrawing from 
Vietnam would harm America‟s reputation as the world‟s leading democracy and superpower, 
Neoconservatives distinguished themselves from the traditional conservative movement by 
advocating combative foreign policies, while not criticizing the government‟s domestic 
interventions.   
The Neoconservative Movement was not the only response to the Vietnam War that 
would become a significant factor in America‟s war-making policies.  The Total Force Policy, 
colloquially known as the Abrams Doctrine, named after General Creighton Abrams, who had 
led U.S. forces in Vietnam from 1968-1972, changed the composition of American combat 
forces or at least how they were discussed.  Abrams, who had become Army Chief of Staff by 
1972, restructured the U.S. Army to guarantee that the United States would not be able to go to 
war without activating the Guard and Reserves.  Viewing Johnson‟s unwillingness to activate the 
Guard and Reserves in the Vietnam as one of the main reasons for the war‟s loss, Abrams sought 
                                                 
19. Irving Kristol, “The Neoconservative Persuasion,” The Weekly Standard, August 25, 2003. 
10 
  
to ensure that the U.S. military would never again bear the brunt of foreign policy directives 
while the civilian population remained comparably unaffected.  This strategic restructuring of the 
military would directly contrast with the Neoconservatives of the Reagan and Bush 
Administrations, which sought to crush opponents militarily without the Reserves and with as 
little domestic backlash as possible.
20
  With Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney‟s privatization of 
the military in the early 1990s, the Abrams Doctrine was undercut by the politically-driven 
imperative to execute an aggressive foreign policy agenda with a minimum number of U.S. 
troops. 
As Abrams had done with his restructuring of the Army, Congress also attempted to 
prevent another disastrous, Vietnam-like war.  With the War Powers Resolution of 1973, 
Congress asserted itself as the preeminent branch of government on the issue of war.  
Recognizing that the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution had effectively given Presidents Lyndon B. 
Johnson and Richard Nixon free reign in Vietnam, Congress wanted to ensure that presidential 
prerogative did not persist in the post-Vietnam era.  And, though the legislation did see limited 
successes, its ultimate demise would come during the Reagan Administration‟s Iran-Contra 
defense, in which notable Neoconservatives, such as Cheney, Paul Wolfowitz, and Jeanne 
Kirkpatrick, advocated that President Reagan had been well within his constitutional authority as 
Commander-in-Chief to execute certain facets of foreign policy without Congressional approval.   
The only substantial work that looks at the intersection of the Abrams Doctrine and the 
War Powers Resolution is political commentator Rachel Maddow‟s Drift: The Unmooring of 
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American Military Power.
21
  Maddow concludes that America‟s foreign policy initiatives since 
Vietnam have simply been an extension of presidential prerogative, first exercised by President 
Johnson during the Vietnam War; more specifically, she argues that presidents, once bestowed 
with powers beyond the office of the presidency, have not given up that power.  Maddow‟s work 
offers political commentary on this issue, with suggestions of how to correct this political 
deficiency, and is certainly the template for the scope of this thesis.  With full respect to her 
scholarship, there is an element from Maddow‟s book that is missing, which this thesis attempts 
to correct. 
While the Abrams Doctrine and the War Powers Resolution were explicit, definitive 
reactions to Vietnam, the third reaction—Neoconservatism—should be framed in equally 
important terms when discussing United States foreign policy of the past three decades.  
Refining and expanding Maddow‟s work with an increased number of sources, information, and 
historical context, this thesis adds the Neoconservative element to her work, while agreeing with 
many of her conclusions.  Without adding Neoconservatism to the argument, an important facet 
of the story is lost.  Arguably neither of the other reactions to Vietnam has had such a tangible 
effect on U.S. foreign policy as Neoconservatism.  And with the more recent wars in the Middle 
East, understanding the progression of this ideology, and how it has been able to successfully 
circumvent its contemporaries, is crucial to the understanding of current U.S. foreign policies.           
This chapter provides the background of these three reactions, whose interaction with one 
form the basis in the succeeding chapters.  Simply put, the Neoconservative agenda ran in direct 
contrast to the Abrams Doctrine and the War Powers Resolution.  All three of these reactions to 
                                                 
21. Though best known for her work on MSNBC‟s “The Rachel Maddow Show,” Maddow obtained her 
B.A. in public policy from Stanford University and her Ph.D. in politics from Oxford University, where she attended 
as a Rhodes Scholar. Rachel Maddow, Drift: The Unmooring of American Military Power (New York: Broadway 
Paperbacks, 2012), 10.   
12 
  
Vietnam attempted to correct the perceived mistakes made in that conflict, but one—
Neoconservatism—took an approach that was fundamentally different than the other two.  
Outlining the history of the Neoconservative Movement and establishing its tenets, and its 
relationships to the American political system, providing the reasoning of and the arguments 
regarding the Abrams Doctrine, and delving into Congress‟s attempts to reestablish itself as the 
war-making branch, this chapter details how all three of these topics began to shape American 
foreign policy ideas in the post-Vietnam era.       
NEOCONSERVATISM 
As American involvement in Vietnam dwindled in the early 1970s, one of the reactions 
to the war evolved into a political ideology that has become a prominent power broker in 
America‟s foreign policy agenda: Neoconservatism.  Adherents of Neoconservatism, a political 
school of thought arising in the late 1960s and early 1970s, argued that America needed to 
continue its campaign in Vietnam and that a withdrawal would hurt the United States‟ ability to 
lead globally.  Distressed by what they saw as the “unpatriotic” antiwar movement, 
Neoconservatives were adamant that America was still the world‟s leading democracy and could 
maintain its superiority through military might and an eventual victory in Vietnam.   
In the fifty years following the Vietnam War, Neoconservatives have continued to argue 
for American interventions in countries all over the world.  Neoconservatives found their 
political niche in the Reagan Administration in the 1980s, which strongly opposed the spread of 
Communism and was willing to confront that challenge with force.  It was during the George 
H.W. Bush Administration, however, that the Neoconservatives and their ideas were catapulted 
into the national spotlight, as the First Gulf War became the first major military engagement 
since Vietnam, and leading Neoconservatives, such as Dick Cheney, Paul Wolfowitz, and I. 
13 
  
Lewis “Scooter” Libby, were spearheading that campaign.  With a history of advocating for 
presidential prerogative and doctrines that supplant Legislative will, Neoconservatives have 
heavily influenced the foreign policy agendas of both Republican and Democratic 
administrations.  Every administration since the Reagan era has either been filled with 
Neoconservatives or has benefitted from Neoconservatives‟ practices, as is the case with 
Presidents Bill Clinton and Barack Obama.  But the gains of the Neoconservatives were not 
instantaneous; the political movement struggled to gain legitimacy in the 1960s and 1970s, and 
only found success during a time in which administrations were supportive of American 
diplomacy through military excursions.  
HISTORY OF THE NEOCONSERVATIVE MOVEMENT 
Political pundits, historians, and journalists frequently referred to “Neoconservatism” 
when describing the George W. Bush Administration‟s political ideology, but few actually 
defined the term.  Since Neoconservatism has become a “hot button” topic in the past decade, it 
is crucial to understand exactly what is meant by it.   
 Neoconservatism has its roots in the 1960s and 1970s. The founders of Neoconservatism 
self-identified as liberals and ardent supporters of the Democratic Party.
 22
  The founding 
philosophies of Neoconservatism have led to the creation of a political ideology that denounces 
liberalism, yet is denounced by traditional conservatives.
23
  Although the founders of the 
ideology were self-labeled Democrats in the 1960s, Neoconservatism has become closely aligned 
                                                 
22. Justin Vaisse refers to Neoconservatives as former “Scoop Jackson Democrats,” named for Henry 
Jackson, who was a Washington State Democrat known for his traditional liberal views, yet was a strong opponent 
of Communism.  The notion that Neoconservatives bemoan domestic intervention is historically false; it is one of 
their distinguishable traits from traditional, or paleoconservatism.  Justin Vaisse, Neoconservatism: The Biography 
of a Movement (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010).     
 
23. “Traditional conservatives,” are also referred to as “Paleoconservatives.”  Because Neoconservatives 
have criticized Paleoconservatives for not properly governing a modern democracy, this has led to a schism in the 
conservative wing of American politics. Kristol,“The Neoconservative Persuasion.”  
 
14 
  
and associated with the Republican Party. The domestic agenda of the Neoconservative 
Movement appears very different than the mainstream conservative movement; they do not 
bemoan government intervention in economics (in contrast to the laissez faire economics most 
conservatives advocate), but they do believe that liberal social movements have created a litany 
of domestic problems rather than solved them.  Moreso than the domestic differences, the foreign 
policy agenda of the Neoconservative Movement has distinguished it from both liberals and 
conservatives.
24
   
 There are generally two theories among historians and political scientists on the origins 
of Neoconservatism: 1) a disillusionment with liberalism directly resulting from Lyndon 
Johnson‟s Great Society and War on Poverty and 2) a reaction to the Vietnam War and the anti-
war movement.  Although this thesis argues that the latter has had a greater impact on the 
Neoconservative Movement, scholarship from both sides of the debate is needed to fully 
appreciate that assertion. 
DEFINITIONS OF NEOCONSERVATISM 
In American Conservatism: An Encyclopedia, Neoconservatism is defined as “a right-
wing branch of American liberalism that emerged in the late 1960s and early 1970s, largely as a 
reaction to liberal utopianism and the irrationality of the new Left.”25  It is clear that the editors 
of the encyclopedia are addressing both the domestic and foreign policies that angered many 
Neoconservatives, highlighting their differences with the 1960s Democrats.  Though the 
encyclopedia gives a brief description of the topic, it clearly outlines why the Neoconservative 
                                                 
24. Gary Dorrien, The Neoconservative Mind: Politics, Culture, and the War of Ideology, (Philadelphia: 
Temple University Press, 1993), 1. 
 
25. Bruce Frohnen, Jeremy Beer, and Jeffrey O. Nelson, American Conservatism: An Encyclopedia 
(Wilmington: ISI Books, 2006), 610. 
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Movement began.  The historiography tends to expand this definition, while maintaining that 
foreign policy is the most important factor in the movement‟s development.   
 As Irving Kristol, the Father of Neoconservatism, argues in his book, Reflections of a 
Neoconservative, “Neoconservatism is a current of thought emerging out of the academic-
intellectual world and provoked by disillusionment with contemporary liberalism.”26  Kristol 
argues that the Neoconservative Movement was created in response to the “extreme” tenets 
adopted by the 1960s Democrats.  Though he does not specify whether or not he is referring to 
domestic or foreign policies, it can be assumed that both play a role in his definition, as he 
further outlines each in his book.   
The disillusionment theory of Neoconservatism‟s creation is a consistent theme of the 
writings on the topic.  In his book, The Neoconservative Mind, American social ethicist Gary 
Dorrien dissects the origins of the modern Neoconservative Movement on the first page and 
argues:  
Most of these new conservatives were former radicals; all of them had supported 
the early civil rights movement.  Some were opposed to America‟s war in 
Vietnam; all were repulsed by America‟s antiwar movement.  Most were 
Democrats who supported a limited welfare state; all had turned against the 
politics and culture of American liberalism.
27
   
 
Neoconservatives began to see the “utopianism” of the American Left as unrealistic.  Policies, 
like Johnson‟s Great Society, came under scrutiny because it created dependency on the state, 
which, Neoconservatives argued, hindered America‟s chances at becoming a more powerful 
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nation.
28
  Although mentioning the disillusionment with liberalism‟s domestic agenda, Dorrien 
argues that foreign policy and American hegemony played a more crucial role in the 
development of the Neoconservative Movement than the domestic policies of Kennedy, Johnson, 
and Nixon.   
TENETS OF NEOCONSERVATISM 
 Although Kristol states, “there is no set of neoconservative beliefs concerning foreign 
policy, only a set of attitudes derived from historical experience,” the Neoconservatives have 
guided and/or created American foreign policy significantly during and since the Reagan era.
29
 
Neoconservatism is a nationalist ideology, and the antiwar movement of the 1960s caused its 
adherents to become more entrenched in the idea of American superiority.
 30
  As historian David 
Noon argues, “As one of the primary ideological artifacts of the cold war, neoconservatism 
emerged from arguments over . . . foreign policies that came to crisis during and after the 
American war in Vietnam.”31   
It was because of the perceived “anti-American” fervor personified in the antiwar 
movement of the Left that Neoconservatives found their ideology more closely aligning with 
traditional conservatives, which is why they remain identified with the Right in American 
politics today.  The foreign policy agenda promoted by the Neoconservatives since the Vietnam 
War has been simple: the United States should promote American democracy throughout the rest 
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of the world, often through military force. Quoting Kristol, Dorrien states, “We [the US] are a 
strong nation, and they will respect our strength as well as our loyalty to our own political and 
social ideals.”32  Instead of highlighting their opposition to domestic policies of both the Left and 
the Right, Dorrien maintains that foreign policy ideals are what separate Neoconservatives from 
the Left and traditional conservatives.  Several authors have agreed with Dorrien‟s assertion. 
In his article entitled, “The Neoconservatives Are History,” political scientist James 
Kurth echoes Dorrien‟s sentiments in how foreign policy played a direct role in the formation of 
Neoconservatism:  
Their concentrated and uncompromising focus upon communist ideology and the 
Soviet threat made them very different from the traditional conservatives or 
realists. There thus opened up a great divide among conservatives in regard to 
U.S. foreign policy, a split that has now persisted for more than thirty years—
through successive eras of Cold War, rogue-state, and Islamist threats.
33
   
 
Kurth suggests that in order for Neoconservatives to have political capital, they must have 
something to oppose, usually militarily.  During the formative years of the Neoconservative 
ideology, Communism was the major foe.  Since the fall of the U.S.S.R., America has no great 
enemy left to challenge its superiority on that scale; however, as seen by the string of 
interventions beginning in Reagan era, Neoconservatives seek to answer challenges presented by 
other opponents of American democracy.
34
 
 Examining the Neoconservative foreign policy agenda in the post-Cold War era, Noon 
asserts that “for contemporary neoconservatives, the conclusions are self-evident: an aggressive 
foreign policy that promotes the spread of America‟s central values represents the only 
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legitimate path to winning the war on terror and preserving American identity.”35  The role of 
U.S. interventionism within the Neoconservative ideology is not a new concept, wholly created 
by scholars studying the movement.  Kristol wrote about this idea, calling it a “new conservative 
nationalism” in the Cold War era.  In essence, it was not enough for the U.S. to contain 
Communists; it had to actively combat them.
36
  This more aggressive foreign policy agenda 
finding political allies in the Reagan Administration and its numerous interventions in Latin 
America, fueled by the Administration‟s anti-Communist fervor, carried over to the War on 
Terror.   
 Citing the tenets of the Neoconservative ideology, Kurth explains that the interventionism 
undertaken by the U.S. in the Iraq War emphasized a direct contradiction in the movement‟s 
domestic and foreign policies:   
[T]he neoconservatives were very critical or skeptical about the efficacy and 
value of social reforms implemented by a strong state. There thus opened up a 
great contradiction within the neoconservative ideology between its foreign-
policy and domestic-policy elements. . . . This contradiction reached its highest, 
and most absurd, point with the Iraq War, when the neoconservatives urged that a 
strong U.S. state, an American hegemony, could and should impose not only 
regime change but fundamental political, economic, and social reforms on another 
society, one which was totally different from America.
37
  
 
 Kurth‟s analysis reflects the more contemporary views of the Neoconservative ideology.  The 
contemporary, fundamental critique of Neoconservatism is that it bemoans the domestic, social 
reforms implemented by a strong state, much like its opposition to the Great Society; however, 
the strong state, through military force, can implement any type of reform, in any country in the 
world, because of its position of power.  As political commentator and former Neoconservative 
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Murray Polner writes, “. . . [T]he Iraq War was an integral part of their unshakeable faith that 
[Neoconservatives] knew how to reshape and inject democratic rule into the autocratic, complex 
and chaotic Middle East.”38   Journalist George Packer focuses on the Neoconservative influence 
in the Iraq War writing that reputable Neoconservatives such Paul Wolfowitz and Douglas Feith 
advocated the removal of Saddam Hussein to guarantee U.S. interests and were “supremely 
confident” in their ideas.39 The Neoconservative idea of American democracy is unique in its 
belief of democracy‟s universality; that is to say, the countries and cultures on which 
Neoconservatives have advocated an implementation of American democracy are not often fully 
understood by them.  The irony in this is simple: for an ideology so focused on geopolitics, it 
lacks an understanding of other countries and its issues.
40
   
 With the U.S. government‟s emphasis on foreign policy beginning in the Reagan era and 
exponentially growing since the fall of the Soviet Union, Neoconservative ideals have reached 
their apex of influence.  Advocating that America‟s interests abroad should be protected, even 
preemptively, Neoconservatives have found a niche in American politics.  And because of that 
reason, as this thesis argues, Neoconservatives were formed and have risen to prominence 
because of their insistence on American superiority facilitated by military interventions.     
 The time in which Neoconservatism was conceptualized is crucial in understanding its 
path to power.  In the post-Vietnam era, the “ghost of Vietnam” was ever-present in American 
foreign policy decisions.  A majority of foreign policy decisions were prefaced with “Will this 
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become another Vietnam?” or “How will the American people rally behind this policy?”  And as 
a philosophy that promoted American interventions in the period that followed Vietnam, 
Neoconservatism initially struggled to persuade large audiences to their point of view.  One of 
the main detriments to the Neoconservative cause was that other groups, more powerful than 
them at the time, were promoting ideas that were critical of their objectives.    
Trying to correct some of the deficiencies in America‟s war-making powers, the military 
and Congress brought their own, post-Vietnam ideas to foreign policy.  At the same time the 
Neoconservatives were promoting “staying the course” in Southeast Asia, the military, Congress, 
and American people were advocating the exact opposite approach.  One of these approaches—a 
direct response to President Johnson‟s refusal to call-up the Guard and Reserves—the Abrams 
Doctrine sought to make interventions (like Neoconservatives advocated) more difficult.
 41
   
LYNDON JOHNSON AND THE “RESERVES QUESTION” 
When President Johnson escalated the war in Southeast Asia, he was determined to do so 
in a way that would cause as little consternation with the American people as possible.  In 1964, 
Johnson had campaigned against Arizona Republican Senator Barry Goldwater on the platform 
that an escalation in Vietnam was irresponsible and reckless, a contrast to Goldwater‟s approach.  
Goldwater, in an interview on the ABC program, “Issues and Answers,” stated that low-yield 
nuclear bombs should be used to “defoliate” the jungles of Vietnam, exposing the supply lines of 
the Viet Cong.
42
  Conversely, while speaking at Akron University, Johnson expressed his stance: 
“We are not about to send American boys 9 or 10,000 miles away from home to do what Asian 
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boys ought to be doing for themselves.”43  After Goldwater‟s pro-nuclear interview (and the 
iconic Johnson campaign commercial of a little girl picking daisies, while a nuclear explosion 
erupted in the background), Johnson easily took the presidency in a landslide victory, winning 
sixty-eight percent of the vote.
44
   
 An important fact is missing from Johnson‟s speech at Akron University, however:  the 
Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, which had been passed overwhelmingly two months earlier.  The 
Gulf of Tonkin Resolution was the first—and only—congressional authorization for military 
intervention during the entire U.S. campaign in Southeast Asia.  Passed on August 7, 1964, with 
an 88-2 vote in the Senate and a unanimous vote in the House of Representatives, the Gulf of 
Tonkin Resolution became the legal basis on which Presidents Johnson and Nixon waged war in 
Vietnam.  Stating, “The Congress approves and supports the determination of the President, as 
Commander in Chief, to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces 
of the United States and to prevent further aggression,” the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution gave the 
President Congressional approval to use military force in Vietnam.
 45
  Highlighting that fact 
during his reelection campaign, however, was not in Johnson‟s best interest, considering he had 
worked very hard to distance himself from Goldwater‟s aggressive foreign policy agenda.  It was 
after the 1964 election and his inauguration in 1965 that Johnson‟s intent to escalate in Vietnam 
became evident. 
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 In his book, America’s Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975, 
historian George Herring discusses the battle between the supporters and dissenters of Johnson‟s 
strategy in Vietnam.
46
  In the early stages of the escalation, Secretary of Defense Robert 
McNamara was a staunch advocate of increasing troop levels in Southeast Asia.  In his memoir, 
President Johnson noted McNamara‟s insistence on raising the troop levels, stating that 
McNamara requested an additional 100,000 troops.
47
  Not all within the administration were as 
convinced that a troop increase was an effective strategy for the war.  In a memorandum to 
President Johnson on July 1, 1965, Undersecretary of State George Ball wrote, “No one can 
assure you that we can beat the Viet Cong or even force them to the conference table on our 
terms, no matter how many hundred thousand white, foreign (U.S.) troops we deploy.”48  In the 
end, despite these concerns, Johnson sided with McNamara and troop deployments increased 
throughout 1965, with an open-ended commitment to employ American military forces as the 
situation demanded.
49
  Under the terms of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, this open-ended 
agreement was legal and acceptable.  But, as Johnson knew, increasing the U.S. military 
presence in Vietnam would cause a greater disruption at home.  Determined to minimize the 
effects, Johnson sought to take the nation to war with as little domestic backlash as possible. 
  Believing that he could not convince the American people that an intervention in 
Vietnam was necessary, Johnson sought to avoid making that plea.  After all, he had defeated 
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Goldwater by depicting him as a warmonger; Johnson saw a flip-flop on the issue as politically 
unviable.  So, the question for the Johnson Administration became how to wage a war without 
the American public feeling its full effects.  One of the ways in which Johnson was able to 
accomplish this feat was by increasing the number of draftees to fill the holes left by active duty 
servicemen.  Concerned with hearing from powerful constituents, whose sons served in the 
Reserves, Johnson decided that conscription was a better course of action.  He believed that 
instating a draft, which disproportionately drafted Americans from lower socioeconomic status 
and less affluent parents, would minimize the number of political enemies he would make.
50
 
In a press conference on July 28, 1965, Johnson announced his plans for increased 
military intervention in Vietnam, supported by an increase in draftees.  Johnson stated, “This 
[action in Vietnam] will make it necessary to increase our active fighting forces by raising the 
monthly draft call from 17,000 over a period of time to 35,000 per month, and for us to step up 
our campaign for voluntary enlistments.”51  According to the Selective Service System, between 
August 1964 and February 1973 about 1.8 million Americans were drafted into the U.S. 
military.
52
  Some have argued, as does this thesis, that the number of draftees was highly inflated 
because of Johnson‟s decision not to enlist the Reserves.  The decision of whether or not to call-
up the Reserves is where the Johnson war strategy became contested within his administration.  
The Reserves have a long, storied past in American military history, and their contributions, or 
                                                 
50. According to the National Vietnam Veterans Foundation, 76% of those drafted were from low 
socioeconomic backgrounds, with 23% having parents in professional positions. “Facts about the Vietnam War,” 
National Vietnam Veterans Foundation, accessed November 20, 2014, 
http://nationalvietnamveteransfoundation.org/facts.html.  Christian Appy‟s book, Working-Class War, demonstrates 
the extent to which working class Americans contributed far more to the war than those from the upper class.  
Christian Appy, Working-Class War: American Combat Soldiers in Vietnam (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1993). 
   
51. Lyndon Johnson, “Press Conference on July 28, 1965,” Johnson’s Escalation of Vietnam: A Timeline, 
accessed November 20, 2014,  http://www.pbs.org/moyers/journal/11202009/profile.html. 
 
52. “Induction Statistics,” U.S. Selective Service System, accessed November 20, 2014, 
https://www.sss.gov/induct.htm. 
24 
  
lack thereof, since Vietnam has created a culture of misunderstanding, disdain, and controversy 
within and surrounding the Reserves. 
THE EVOLUTION OF THE RESERVES 
The idea of the Reserves began with the Founding Fathers.  Thomas Jefferson, during the 
framing of the U.S. Constitution, adamantly denounced the idea of standing army, stating that it 
was inconsistent with freedom.
53
  Believing that a standing army makes a country more prone to 
react to any “speck of war on the horizon,” this idea of the citizen-soldier became the basis for 
Jefferson‟s military doctrine.54  Under this philosophy, Americans (in Jefferson‟s time, white 
males) should be soldiers in time of war; however, when in peacetime, large armies were not 
needed and citizens should carry on with daily life.
55
  The sentiment of military campaigns being 
supported by citizen-soldiers was still advocated over one hundred years later: “It is the 
traditional policy of the United States that the military establishment in time of peace is to be a 
small, regular Army and that the ultimate war force of the Nation is to be a great Army of 
citizen-soldiers.  This fundamental theory of military organization is sound economically and 
politically.”56  This Jeffersonian idea of the citizen-soldier defines the modern Reserves.     
When Reservists are not called to duty, they are often fixtures in their local communities 
and their role as local fixtures makes a call-up more politically challenging.  President Johnson 
knew activating the Reserves would lead to an increased public awareness that America was 
fighting a war. Echoing this same idea, military historian Lewis Sorley states: 
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Johnson‟s refusal was apparently motivated in part by reluctance to spread the 
effects of the war through the population—certainly many more families and 
virtually every town and city would be affected by a call-up of any proportions, 
with a much different class cross-section and much greater political impact than 
draft calls affecting only those who could not engineer a deferment.  Another 
reason for Lyndon Johnson‟s unwillingness to call up the reserves was the hope 
that he could prosecute the war on a low-key basis not really having to go to war 
big time.
57
 
 
In another attempt to wage war quietly, Johnson asked Congress for as little money as 
necessary.  George A. Carver, Jr., a CIA official, later recalled that Johnson “tried to fight a war 
on the cheap, and tried to fight a war without acknowledging that he was fighting a war.”58  In a 
telephone conversation with Senator Richard Russell (D-GA), Johnson stated, “We don‟t think 
we‟ll ask for much money [from Congress] because we don‟t want to blow this thing up.”59  In 
that same telephone conversation with Russell, Johnson discussed the issue of activating the 
Reserves:  
Johnson: But I don‟t think I‟ll call [the Reserves] up now.  I think it‟s too 
dramatic.  I think it commits me where I can‟t get out.  And it puts me out 
there further than I want to get right at the moment. Now does that make 
sense to you? 
 
Russell: Yes. Except it adds to old Ho Chi Minh‟s argument that we ain‟t 
going to stay in there.  That we‟re going to pull out.  It may ease the 
pressure that we . . . hoped Russia would put on to get him out. 
 
Johnson: What do you think? 
 
Russell: Call up the Reserves.  They understand that language. 
  
Johnson: If I extended the enlistment, if I put a hundred thousand out 
there, they‟ll understand it.  I‟m afraid they‟ll understand it too much.  I 
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don‟t have to have the Reserves to do that.  And I‟m going to step up my 
draft calls. Double them.
60
 
 
Johnson acknowledged that activating the Reserves meant the American public would notice the 
war, because it meant that those often influential community members were going to be ripped 
from their daily lives, in cities all over the country.   
Recognizing what Johnson was trying to do, many within the administration tried to 
persuade him to active the Reserves. As Herring states, “The JCS [Joint Chiefs of Staff] pressed 
for mobilization of the reserves and calling up the National Guard to make clear, as [Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff] Wheeler later put it, that the United States was not becoming engaged 
in „some two-penny military adventure.‟”61  Having the support of the American people became 
the paramount concern of Johnson‟s foreign policy advisors.  Secretary McNamara, an early 
supporter of the increased intervention in Vietnam, became concerned about the implications that 
it may have for the administration‟s political capital.  Many urged Johnson to seek another 
Congressional resolution to bolster public support.  Former Ambassador to South Vietnam Henry 
Cabot Lodge, Jr. later asked, “How do you send young men there in great numbers without 
telling why?”62  But the concern with public support did not dissuade Johnson from conducting 
the war, as the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution permitted him to do.  Assured by Attorney General 
Nicholas Katzenbach that he did not need additional Congressional approval, Johnson continued 
his plan “to avoid undue concern and excitement in Congress and in domestic public opinion.”63   
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The United States found itself in quite a predicament: it was fighting a domestically 
“quiet” war, with an active duty force, consisting mainly of draftees.  It was the antithesis of 
Thomas Jefferson‟s vision.  The lives of the American people were disrupted minimally, but the 
U.S. military was not as fortunate.  The military command in Vietnam believed that changes 
needed to be made, that American lives needed to be disrupted, that the Reserves needed to be a 
part of war.  And so, by the time General Creighton Abrams arrived in Washington, D.C. as 
Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army in 1972, the ability to wage a major war without calling up the 
Reserves and “exciting” the Congress and the American public was the first item on his agenda.   
CREIGHTON ABRAMS AND THE ABRAMS DOCTRINE 
 In his article, “Creighton Abrams and Active Reserve Integration in Wartime,” and 
subsequent book, Thunderbolt: General Creighton Abrams and the Army of His Times, historian 
Lewis Sorley investigates Abrams‟s preoccupation with restructuring the Army during his tenure 
as Chief of Staff.
64
  At the conclusion of his research, Sorley argues that Abrams‟s intention was 
“to so organize the forces that it would never again be possible to take the Army to war without 
its reserves.”65  Outlining Abrams‟s love for the military, Sorley states that the restructuring for 
Abrams was personal; he wanted to ensure that another Vietnam could not decimate his beloved 
institution.  And Abrams‟s admiration for the military was obvious.   
While discussing the Army, Abrams said, “[the Army] represents a constancy of those 
essential virtues of mankind—humility, courage, devotion, sacrifice.  The world has changed a 
lot.  I choose to feel that this is part of the cement and the steel that holds our great country 
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together.”66  In a speech given to the American Ordinance Association in Philadelphia prior to 
his departure for Vietnam in 1967, Abrams said of the Army‟s accomplishments in the early 
years of the Vietnam War:  
Without the declaration of a national emergency, without calling up the reserves, 
without extending terms of service, and without requiring the nation‟s business 
and industry to shift to wartime footing, the Army has successfully discharged an 
assortment of missions in about one hundred foreign lands. . . . Instead of being 
weary or out of breath, this Army is bigger, wiser, and better conditioned than it 
was at the beginning.
67
 
 
Although boastful of the Army‟s ability to adapt to Johnson‟s refusal to acknowledge that the 
United States was fighting a war, Abrams would make sure it would never have to make those 
adaptations again.   
 One of the consequences of not calling up the Reserves was that the Army had to 
compensate for having inexperienced leadership in Vietnam.  Because of the rapid and enormous 
expansion of the Army during this time, coupled with the increased casualty rates depleting the 
pool of viable leadership candidates, the number of inexperienced officers prematurely promoted 
to leadership positions skyrocketed.
68
  Many within the Army complained bitterly that the 
inexperienced officers were harming the mission and that activating the Reserves would place 
better trained, more experienced leaders in the field.  Accompanying the smaller pool of soldiers 
came successive tours, longer deployments, drug abuse, and other behaviors that became 
synonymous with the Army in Vietnam era.
69
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 But, Johnson‟s decision not to mobilize the Reserves did more than just harm the active 
duty soldiers; it also crushed the morale of the Reserves.  Those who were career Reservists had 
been preparing to be called-up when conflicts such as Vietnam arose. The war in Vietnam was 
what Reservists trained for; however, they were not going to participate because of political 
considerations.  As Sorley explains, “The Army was mobilizing for war.  There was just one big 
problem: the reserve components, which had been maintained at such expense and effort over the 
years in anticipation of exactly such a need, were not going to be allowed to take part.”70 
Not only did many Reservists feel as if their careers had been wasted, but the influx of 
those seeking to avoid service enhanced the Reserves‟ reputation for being a refuge to those too 
cowardly to serve on active duty.  As Sorley denotes, “It was all perfectly legal [enlistment in the 
Reserves to avoid active duty], even (perhaps) legitimate, but the proud reservists . . . were 
horrified and disgusted as their ranks became progressively infested by those whose motivation 
was exactly the opposite, a devout desire to avoid going to war.”71   
A consequence of the Reserves not being mobilized was that their portion of the defense 
budget got smaller.  In 1965, the Reserves received 5.2% of the Defense Department budget.  In 
1968, it received 4.4%.  Although the 0.8% decrease is not a glaringly disproportionate figure, it 
must be noted that the Defense Department budget increased by 49.6% during that same time 
($46,752,051,000 in 1965 to $69,936,620,000 in 1968).
72
  The total dollar amount of the 
Reserves‟ budget increased; however, with more soldiers enlisting in the Reserves, the money 
had to be stretched further, leading to less being spent on infrastructure and upkeep.  With the 
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active duty forces shouldering the burden of fighting in Vietnam, the Reserves‟ equipment, 
training, and support saw few upgrades, leading to an increased self-image problem.  The self-
image problem caused by a lack of respect from the Department of Defense, active duty soldiers, 
and the nation was fundamentally challenged by the Abrams Doctrine, because it was no longer 
possible for the Reserves not to be deployed in times of conflict.   
THE RESTRUCTURING OF THE ARMY 
 After leading in Vietnam from 1968 to 1972, General Abrams returned to the United 
States to assume the position of Chief of Staff of the Army.  Often basing his objectives for the 
military‟s organization on historical trends, Abrams stated, “We have paid, and paid, and paid 
again in blood and sacrifice for our unpreparedness. I don‟t want war, but I am appalled at the 
human cost that we‟ve paid because we wouldn‟t prepare to fight.”73  And Abrams was quite 
adamant about solving the Army‟s proclivity for unpreparedness; the Abrams Doctrine was the 
first step.   
 Seeing the strain that Vietnam had put on his beloved army, Abrams restructured the 
Army to ensure that calling up the Reserves was not optional for the President; it was mandatory.  
Into the 16-division structure, the Reserves were woven into necessary functions so that the 
Army could not be deployed without them.  Abrams outlined the goal of the restructuring thus: 
“We are committed firmly to the essential task of bolstering the readiness and responsiveness of 
the Reserve Components, integrating them fully into the total force.”74  What is most important 
about the Abrams Doctrine, however, is not the restructuring itself, but its implications.  
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Although some argue, like Sorley, that Abrams simply was trying to reinvigorate the 
Army after the defeat in Vietnam, the inability to wage war without a call-up of Reservists is the 
Abrams Doctrine‟s lasting legacy.  General William Rosson said of Abrams‟ intentions that 
sending the Reserves to Vietnam “would have forced a debate on the whole issue of support for 
the war. Instead, what resulted was simply a „gutting‟ of the regular establishment as the reserves 
remained out of reach and the larger issue of involvement in the war remained unresolved.”75  
Changing that, Abrams ensured that the Reserves were the “initial and primary source of 
augmentation of the active forces in any future emergency requiring a rapid and substantial 
expansion of the active forces.”76  By requiring the Reserves to serve as the primary 
augmentation source, the debate that General Rosson argued had been ignored in Vietnam was 
now forced.     
Many military officials championed Abrams‟s restructuring.  Former Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff General John Vessey said of Abrams: “[Abrams thought] let‟s not build an 
Army off here in the corner someplace. . . . That was his lesson from Vietnam. . . . And part and 
parcel of that was that you couldn‟t go to war without calling up the reserves.”77  Further 
confirmation comes from Colonel Harry Summers, who stated, “General Abrams hoped this . . . 
would correct one of the major deficiencies of the American involvement in the Vietnam War—
the commitment of the army to sustained combat without the explicit support of the American 
people as expressed by their representatives in Congress.”78  And this explicit support from the 
                                                 
75. Rosson quoted in Sorley, “Creighton Abrams and Active-Reserve Integration in Wartime,” 40. 
 
76. Secretary of Defense Melvin O. Laird, Memorandum, “Readiness of the Selected Reserve,” August 21, 
1970. 
 
77. Vessey quoted in Sorley, “Creighton Abrams and Active-Reserve Integration in Wartime,” 46. 
 
78. Colonel Harry Summers quoted in Sorley, “Creighton Abrams and Active-Reserves Integration in 
Wartime,” 46. 
32 
  
American Congress and public is the lasting political implication of General Abrams‟s 
restructuring of the Army.  As Rachel Maddow writes in Drift, Abrams was attempting to right a 
wrong that had been committed in Vietnam.  Because as the Jeffersonian idea of the citizen-
soldiers promoted, requiring a country to send Reservists to war would ensure that “when the 
United States went to war, the entire United States went to war.”79  The issue of taking the 
military out of the national spotlight during Vietnam was not just something military 
commanders and political commentators bemoaned; it was a theme also explored in literary 
works. 
In his novel, Fields of Fire, Vietnam veteran, former Secretary of the Navy and former 
Senator of Virginia Jim Webb describes a conversation between a new-to-the-war soldier and a 
battle-hardened officer.  Deftly explaining the war‟s perception in the United States, the officer 
states: 
We all knew it would get bigger, though, and we figured Johnson would call up 
the Reserves.  We kept telling all the Weekend Warriors that they‟d better get 
their shit in one bag, because they were going to war.  Like Korea.  And it got 
bigger, but Johnson didn‟t have the balls to call up the Reserves.  Reserves can 
vote.  And they drive planes for United.  And they run businesses.  Instead 
Johnson just made a bigger draft, filled it with loopholes, and went after certain 
groups of kids. . . . Airplane drivers still drive their airplanes.  Businessmen still 
run their businesses.  College kids still go to college.  It‟s like nothing really 
happened, except to other people.  It isn‟t touching anybody except us.  It makes 
me sick, Lieutenant. . . . We been abandoned, Lieutenant.
80
   
Explained in powerful, succinct prose, Webb describes exactly what Abrams sought to prevent 
with his restructuring: to make sure that the institution he loved, and all of those young soldiers 
he cared for, would never again feel as if they had been abandoned back home.  Without the 
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disruption to the lives of regular, voting, flying-the-airplanes-for-United Americans, war could 
not be waged.   
Some have argued, however, that these interpretations of the Abrams Doctrine have been 
applied after its advent.  Naval historian Patrick Cronin argues that the Abrams Doctrine was not 
an attempt to garner public support or to disrupt American lives, but it was a natural extension of 
fiscal policies of the 1970s.  Because Reservists do not have to be compensated to the extent that 
full-time, active duty soldiers do, relying on the Reserves made economic sense.  As Cronin 
argues, “The Total Force concept [the Abrams Doctrine], in essence, meant that the fiscal 
stringency being applied to strategic systems was also being applied to the fastest growing 
portion of the defense budget: manpower.”81 
Cronin is not alone in his criticisms of popular interpretations of the Abrams Doctrine.  
Lt. Colonel Brian Jones, historian at the U.S. Army War College, also makes the economic 
argument that “General Abrams‟ actual intention in advocating this policy was an attempt both to 
save force structure and to resource the Reserve Component forces appropriately.”82 Further 
explaining that the interpretations most associated with the Abrams Doctrine are “fallacies,” 
Jones argues that “limiting prolonged combat is the desired outcome.”83  Although Jones states 
that limiting prolonged conflict is the intent of the Abrams Doctrine, he essentially argues the 
same notion as previous scholars, but on economic grounds.   
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The Abrams Doctrine itself is not without critics.  As Cronin reasons, the Abrams 
Doctrine affects “the ability of the United States to respond swiftly and with sufficient military 
force to crises and wars . . . or whether the United States can count on having sufficient time to 
mobilize its Reserves for general war.”84  The Secretary of Defense under George W. Bush and 
notable Neoconservative, Donald Rumsfeld said in 2002 that the Abrams Doctrine was 
“hampering his ability to deploy forces.”85 But despite these criticisms, the Abrams Doctrine is 
an integral part of U.S. military strategy and the military‟s growing dependence on the reserves 
increased throughout the last thirty years, until the theory of military privatization was pioneered 
in the early 1990s by then Secretary of Defense and Neoconservative Dick Cheney.
86
   
  When Creighton Abrams died from complications from lung surgery in 1974, he was 
still serving as Chief of Staff for the Army.  Although only serving in that position for two years, 
Abrams‟ ideas had a tangible effect.  In a memorandum dated August 23, 1973, Secretary of 
Defense James Schlesinger stated, “Total Force is no longer a „concept.‟ It is now the Total 
Force Policy which integrates the Active, Guard and Reserve forces into a homogenous whole.”  
He went on to add, “It must be clearly understood that implicit in the Total Force Policy . . . is 
the fact that the Guard and Reserve forces will be used as the initial and primary augmentation of 
the active forces.”87  And it is because of Abrams‟s love for the military and disgust for how it 
was treated by administrations during Vietnam that the Abrams Doctrine has become an integral 
part of American military theory.     
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It was not only Abrams and other military leadership trying to prevent another disastrous 
war.  Congress, too, was in the midst of drafting an unprecedented check on presidential power, 
which, like the Abrams Doctrine, would face direct opposition from the Neoconservative 
Movement.  As Cronin states, “Among Congressional concerns of the time, the notion of 
preventing future „Vietnams,‟ may have been preeminent.  One means to effect that kind of 
constraint was to harness the President‟s ability to mobilize forces for war.”88  Public Law 93-
148, “A Joint Resolution Concerning the War Powers of Congress and the President,” better 
known as the War Powers Resolution Act of 1973, was the result.  
A REASSERTION OF CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORITY 
 When the framers of the U.S. Constitution were debating what branch should make the 
decision to go to war, they were quick to remember one of their main complaints about King 
George III: maintaining a massive, globe-trotting army.  Crafting the Constitution to make going 
to war difficult, they decided to vest the decision with the cumbersome, slow-moving, and 
debate-driven Congress.  As James Madison wrote, “The Constitution supposes what the History 
of all Governments demonstrates: that the Executive is the branch of power most interested in 
war, and most prone to it.  It has accordingly with studied care vested the question of war in the 
Legislature.” 89  That idea persisted for at least the first fifty years of the Republic.  In a letter to 
lawyer and his future biographer William Herndon, then Illinois Senator Abraham Lincoln wrote 
regarding war-making responsibilities:  
The provision of the Constitution giving the war-making power to Congress was 
dictated, as I understand it, by the following reasons. Kings had always been 
involving and impoverishing their people in wars, pretending generally, if not 
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always, that the good of the people was the object. This, our Convention 
understood to be the most oppressive of all Kingly oppressions; and they resolved 
to so frame the Constitution that no one man should hold the power of bringing 
this oppression upon us.
90
 
But America‟s involvement in Vietnam had seemingly changed these ideas.  Neither Johnson nor 
Nixon sought a Congressional declaration of war (Johnson had the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, as 
Attorney General Katzenbach reminded him and Nixon stated that as Commander-in-Chief he 
had a duty to protect soldiers already in the region).  And so, after years of an unwinnable war in 
Vietnam, with presidents sending troops to the region without seeking Congressional approval, 
and no open, public debate by elected officials about the merits of the war, Congress decided to 
reclaim its authority in the single most important foreign policy decision—war.  President Nixon 
was the target of this initiative.  As Herring notes, “By the early summer of 1973, Nixon‟s ability 
to dangle carrots or brandish sticks had been sharply curtailed by an increasingly rebellious 
Congress.”91   
WAR POWERS RESOLUTION ACT OF 1973 
Introduced in May of 1973, the bill does not mention Vietnam specifically, but its 
language directly addresses a president‟s ability to wage war without congressional approval: “It 
is the purpose of this joint resolution to fulfill the intent of the framers of the Constitution of the 
United States and insure that the collective judgment of both the Congress and the President will 
apply to the introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities.”92  Quite simply, the 
military of the United States could not be brought into a situation like Vietnam without explicit 
support of the American people through their elected representatives.   
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 The War Powers Resolution may have been popular with Congress (it passed in the 
House 245-130 and in the Senate 76-21), but it infuriated President Nixon.  When the War 
Powers Resolution reached Nixon‟s desk for signature, he unsurprisingly vetoed it.  In his 
response to Congress‟s attempt to check presidential authority, Nixon wrote: 
While I am in accord with the desire of the Congress to assert its proper role in 
the conduct of our foreign affairs, the restrictions which this resolution would 
impose upon the authority of the President are both unconstitutional and 
dangerous to the best interests of our Nation. . . . While I firmly believe that a 
veto of House Joint Resolution 542 is warranted solely on constitutional grounds, 
I am also deeply disturbed by the practical consequences of this resolution. For it 
would seriously undermine this Nation's ability to act decisively and convincingly 
in times of international crisis.
93
  
It was Nixon‟s belief that the War Powers Resolution hindered the President‟s potency as 
Commander-in-Chief.  And the Nixon Administration‟s argument regarding the War Powers Act 
is an argument every administration has made since.  What Nixon failed to mention in his 
response, however, was that the President could make quick decisions in times of emergency.  
 The War Powers Resolution contains three main provisions that are still highly contested: 
one, the President must notify Congress within forty-eight hours when U.S. troops are deployed; 
two, all troops must be removed from combat within sixty days unless Congress approves 
otherwise; and three, reports must be submitted to Congress of all missions in which U.S. troops 
are being used.  The language of the bill does not state that a president cannot respond 
accordingly to a national emergency without congressional approval, say an invasion or attack.  
What the law does clearly hinder is a President‟s ability to wage a sustained war.  Even with 
questions of the act‟s constitutionality, Congress overrode Nixon‟s veto and passed the War 
Powers Resolution Act on November 7, 1973. 
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PRESIDENT GERALD FORD AND THE WAR POWERS ACT 
 After Nixon‟s resignation following the Watergate scandal, his successor Gerald Ford 
struggled to reconcile his foreign policy prerogatives and those of Congress.  In 1975, when the 
fall of Saigon was imminent, Ford requested a billion dollars in aid for South Vietnam.  In that 
request, Ford had earmarked $722 million dollars for military aid.
94
  Fearing that the inflated 
proposal was a thinly veiled attempt to reengage U.S. militarily in Vietnam, the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee went to the White House to meet with Ford to express its concerns. 
The declassified minutes of Ford‟s meeting with the Senate Committee outline 
their apprehensions: 
Ford: The $722 million is designed to meet the current situation and is totally 
different from the $300 million. . . . If there isn‟t some indication of aid, the 
situation could disintegrate rapidly. 
 
Senator Jacob Javits (NY-R): I will give you large sums for evacuation, but not 
one nickel for military aid for Thieu [President of South Vietnam]. 
 
Ford:  We are not wanting to put troops in, but we have to have enough funds to 
make it look like we plan to hold for some time. 
 
Senator John Glenn (OH-D):  The idea here is very different from what I 
envisioned. . . . I can see North Vietnam deciding not to let us get these people out 
and attacking our bridgehead.  Then we would have to send forces to protect our 
security force.  That fills me with fear.
95
  
 
Ford found himself in a predicament: he wanted to get evacuees out of South Vietnam and give 
assistance to the Thieu regime to stave off the Communist forces; however, Congress was not 
budging on its no-reengagement policy in Vietnam.  Later, Ford would point out that although he 
did not agree with the War Powers Resolution, he fulfilled his duty by informing Congress of his 
                                                 
94. "Last Vietnam Aid Bill Dies in House." CQ Almanac 1975, 31st ed., 306-15. (Washington, DC: 
Congressional Quarterly, 1976), http://library.cqpress.com/cqalmanac/cqal75-1214000. 
 
95. “Memorandum of Conversation with President Ford, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Henry 
Kissinger, James Schlesinger, April 14, 1975,” Gerald Ford Presidential Library.  
http://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/document/0314/1553026.pdf 
 
39 
  
plans.  In a speech in 1977, he said, “I did not concede that the resolution itself was legally 
binding on the President. . . . Nevertheless, in each instance, I took note of its consultation and 
reporting provisions, and provided certain information on operations and strategies to key 
members of Congress.”96  Ford‟s billion-dollar proposal—including the roughly $300 million for 
evacuations—died in the House, the final vote of 162-246.97  Later, Secretary of Defense Donald 
Rumsfeld (Ford‟s Chief of Staff at the time) wrote in his 2011 memoir that the War Powers 
Resolution “despite its questionable and still untested constitutionality undercut the President‟s 
ability to convince troublemakers of America‟s staying power.”98  Rumsfeld would make the 
same argument during his tenure as Secretary of Defense under George W. Bush, in addition to 
his argument against the Abrams Doctrine. 
PRESIDENT JIMMY CARTER AND THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION 
When Jimmy Carter assumed the presidency, the War Powers Resolution had been a law 
for nearly four years.  Given the public and Congressional backlash following Vietnam, Carter 
was sympathetic to the War Powers Act as a presidential candidate.
99
  During his presidency, 
Carter‟s Office of Legal Counsel upheld the War Powers Resolution‟s central provisions as 
Congress exercising its constitutional authority—the ruling was never reversed.100  But this 
acceptance of the War Powers Resolution has to be contextualized within Carter‟s presidency.  
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During Carter‟s tenure as president, the United States military did not engage in any 
interventions abroad.  The major objective of the Carter Administration differed from its 
predecessors.  The only war Carter wanted to wage was on foreign oil.    
In his “Crisis of Confidence” speech, known as the “Malaise Speech,” speaking to a 
national audience, Carter vowed that the United States would “never use more foreign oil than 
we did in 1977—never.”101  So, Carter‟s support for the War Powers Resolution was easier to 
obtain than Ford‟s.  He was not seeking to intervene in foreign countries, America‟s national 
security was not threatened, and the American people were still reeling from Vietnam.  While his 
speech outlined America‟s initiative to shirk its reliance on foreign oil, as Rachel Maddow 
argues in Drift, Carter buried the lead: “Lost in President Carter‟s ten-car pileup of war 
metaphors was a line that probably should have been his headline that night: that America was „a 
nation that is at peace tonight everywhere in the world.‟”102  Ending the nearly two decades of 
military interventions, Carter chose to focus on domestic policies.  Four months after his speech, 
however, Carter joined his predecessors in weighing the costs and benefits of a military 
intervention.   
 After the U.S.-backed Shah of Iran was deposed, and hostages were taken at the U.S. 
Embassy in Tehran, Carter was faced with the difficult decision of how to extricate the hostages 
from Iran.  In his 1980 State of the Union Address, Carter vowed that the United States would 
not rest until every hostage was released.
103
  While planning the rescue mission, Carter was 
confronted with the War Powers Resolution for the first time.  As one of the provisions stated, 
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the president was required to report any military missions to Congress.  Concerned with keeping 
the rescue mission a secret, however, Carter viewed informing Congress as an unnecessary risk.  
Knowing that rescuing the hostages was the top priority, Carter found a loophole in the War 
Powers Resolution.   
 Under the War Powers Resolution, a president must inform Congress any time U.S. 
troops are sent into “hostilities.” The question became: how could the administration conduct 
secret operations (no matter the justness) if it had to inform Congress every time?  Like every 
president has done since, Carter did not acknowledge the Iranian rescue mission as a “hostile” 
operation.  Despite its use of U.S. troops, entering a foreign country, supplied by the Department 
of Defense, the Carter Administration argued that it was a “humanitarian mission.”   
After the overwhelming failure of Operation Eagle Claw (the attempt to rescue 
the hostages in Tehran), Carter carefully crafted his address to the nation to make clear 
that the intentions were peaceful: 
There was no fighting; there was no combat. . . . The mission on which they 
embarked was a humanitarian mission.  It was not directed against Iran; it was not 
directed against the people of Iran.  It was not undertaken with any feeling of 
hostility toward Iran or its people.  It has caused no Iranian causalities.
104
 
And the explanation of Operation Eagle Claw as a humanitarian mission was how Carter was 
able to avoid alerting Congress.  The War Powers Resolution required congressional approval for 
preplanned military engagements, not humanitarian efforts.   
 After Congress was made aware of Operation Eagle Claw, many condemned Carter for 
his avoidance of the War Powers Resolution.  Senator Frank Church (D-ID) stated, “I think he 
disregarded this provision of the War Powers Act.”  Senator Charles Mathias (R-MD) agreed, “It 
would seem to me that it would be appropriate that at least a limited few members of the 
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Congressional leadership would be consulted.”  Congressman Henry Reuss (D-WI) was far less 
reserved: “I‟m very disturbed by it.  I think the President would be doing a useful thing for the 
country if he promptly announced that he is not a candidate for re-election.”105 
 It was after a midday meeting with Carter that Congressional leaders began to ease the 
rhetoric.  Senator Edmund Muskie (D-ME) said, “I would have been disappointed if plans of this 
kind had not been under preparation.”  Senator Howard Baker (R-TN) championed the decision: 
“My only criticism of the President is they didn‟t do it before now.”  Although the hostages were 
not rescued, and their release was not achieved under Carter (a fact which torpedoed his re-
election campaign), Carter succeeded in finding a workaround to the War Powers Act, setting a 
precedent that has persisted until today, and which Neoconservatives have exploited during their 
times in power.  It should be noted that in 1995, when Congressman Henry Hyde (R-IL) sought 
to repeal the War Powers Resolution, Carter wrote him a letter stating, “I fully support your 
effort to repeal the War Powers Resolution.  Best wishes in this good work.”106 
So while the Army, under the direction of General Abrams was undergoing a 
transformation between 1972 and 1974, the United States Congress was also trying to ensure that 
a president could not send the country into another Vietnam.  Whether it was by activating the 
Reserves and disrupting American lives to the fullest extent, or having to seek authorization from 
Congress under the War Powers Resolution, a president‟s ability to wage war on his own accord 
was under direct attack; the decision would have to be made as a country.  Neoconservatism, 
however, would spend the next thirty years successfully finding loopholes in both of its 
contemporaries.  It would advocate military interventions around the world, without the Reserves 
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and without Congressional approval.  Starting on its path to prominence during the Reagan era, 
Neoconservatism championed the hard-line approach Reagan took in Grenada, Lebanon, and 
Central America, while advocating strongly against Communism.     
CONCLUSION 
 Three reactions to the Vietnam War converged in the mid-1970s.  Neoconservatism 
honed its political acumen in the post-Vietnam era, trying to reconcile its foreign policy ideas 
with a country sharply opposed to war.  The Abrams Doctrine sought to permanently link the 
American public to war and ensure that the entire country participated in war, not just the 
military.  The War Powers Resolution, despite its flaws, reasserted Congress‟s interest in 
conducting major foreign policy decisions.  All three of these reactions were direct responses to 
Vietnam, but in many instances, the Abrams Doctrine and the War Powers Resolution attempted 
to curtail the same thing—presidential prerogative—but the Neoconservative Movement, starting 
in the Reagan Administration, argued against its counterparts.  Each of these reactions brings a 
unique perspective the U.S. foreign policy, and in the subsequent chapters, their interaction with 
one another is explored in depth.   
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CHAPTER TWO 
RONALD REAGAN, GRENADA, IRAN-CONTRA, AND THE 
NEOCONSERVATIVES 
“For many of the ideas that animated our administration can trace their ancestry to 
. . . all of you.” 107 
--President Ronald Reagan, Remarks to the American Enterprise Institute, 1988 
INTRODUCTION 
 As historian Sean Wilentz states in his book The Age of Reagan: A History, 1974-2008, 
Ronald Reagan shares with FDR and Lyndon Johnson the distinction of transforming and 
defining an era in American politics.  Wilentz writes, “Just as the period of American history 
from 1933 to the late 1960s—between the rise of the New Deal and the fall of Lyndon B. 
Johnson‟s Great Society—was chiefly one of liberal reform, so the past thirty-five years have 
been an era of conservatism.”108  The thirty-five years referenced by Wilentz directly reflect the 
legacy of Ronald Reagan and his post-presidency popularity.  Reagan‟s presidency marked a 
turning point in American politics and certainly altered the discussion about America‟s global 
standing.   
During the contentious Republican primaries in 1976 Reagan was catapulted into and 
remained in the national spotlight until his ascension to the presidency in 1980.  But what made 
Reagan a true tour-de-force in American politics were his strongly held convictions regarding the 
superiority of American democracy—a belief shared with Neoconservatives—and his ability to 
persuade a vast swath of the public to share those beliefs.  Reagan tapped into the national desire 
to reclaim America‟s pride after the loss in Vietnam, taking a hardline stance on issues such as 
the Panama Canal and Communism, while advocating for increased military spending to meet 
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those objectives.  Agreeing with Wilentz‟s analysis, there is an “Age of Reagan,” but for reasons 
in addition to it ushering in an era of conservatism. 
Reagan‟s interpretation of presidential power during his tenure, which supplanted the 
War Powers Resolution of 1973, set the precedent for every president since to argue that the 
office of the president holds certain, unilateral powers.  Unlike Jimmy Carter‟s “humanitarian” 
efforts to save the hostages from Tehran, Reagan did not attempt to veil his missions by using the 
same logic, though he would begin his campaign in Grenada on similar footing.  With the help of 
his Administration, filled with adherents to the recently formed Neoconservative Movement such 
as Paul Wolfowitz, Jeane Kirkpatrick, and Richard Perle, and Congressional allies like Dick 
Cheney, one of the major contributions Reagan made to American politics was an expanded 
view of Executive authority. 
While the Neoconservative Movement and the War Powers Resolution clashed with one 
another consistently throughout the 1980s, the Abrams Doctrine, the third reaction to Vietnam 
mentioned in Chapter One, will remain, in this chapter, largely in the background.  The 
expansion of presidential power, facilitated by relatively small military excursions, rendered the 
Abrams Doctrine moot during the Reagan Administration.  Simply put, campaigns such as 
Grenada, Latin America, and Lebanon required a small contingent of U.S. forces, not the 
Vietnam-like call-ups the Abrams Doctrine was designed to prevent.     
Detailed in the chapter that follows is the lineage of the Age of Reagan, starting with 
Reagan‟s failed run for the Republican presidential nomination in 1976 and ending when his 
presidency does in 1989.  Arguing that the combination of anti-Communism and increased 
presidential powers led to a U.S. foreign policy agenda that promoted interventions abroad, this 
chapter argues that the Reagan Administration, with the help of Neoconservative ideas, set the 
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stage for how the Legislative and Executive branches interacted on issues of foreign policy and 
is the nadir for the War Powers Resolution Act of 1973. 
RONALD REAGAN AND THE BEGINNINGS OF THE “REAGAN DOCTRINE” 
 During the 1976 Presidential campaign, Republican Gerald Ford‟s incumbency was being 
threatened by the former governor of California, Ronald Reagan.  Reagan, who had served as 
California Governor from 1967 to 1975, was gaining national political capital.  Ford‟s 
presidency was still reeling from the Watergate scandal and his subsequent pardons of those 
involved.  Reagan‟s sudden rise to the upper echelons of the Republican Party did nothing to 
help Ford‟s reelection campaign; in fact, Reagan‟s run favored Democratic challenger Jimmy 
Carter by splitting Republican voters.
109
  Reagan eventually accepted that he was unable to 
overcome Ford‟s incumbent status for the Party‟s nomination and conceded at the Republican 
National Convention.   But, during a speech which was intended to show his support for 
President Ford, Reagan used the national platform to highlight the issue most important to him: 
foreign policy.   
 Referencing a letter he wrote to be placed in a time capsule for California‟s tricentennial, 
Reagan announced what he believed was at stake in the „76 election:  “We live in a world in 
which the great powers have aimed and poised at each other horrible missiles of destruction, 
nuclear weapons that can in a matter of minutes arrive at each other‟s country and destroy 
virtually the civilized world we live in.”110  The threat of nuclear war, to Reagan and many 
Americans, was the most pressing issue of the time.  The discussion of this topic at the 
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Republican National Convention was not an anomaly for Reagan; he had built his entire „76 
campaign on the issue of foreign policy.  The issue of American foreign policy, the threat of 
nuclear war, and the perceived superiority of the Soviets merged to become Reagan‟s political 
platform.  His speech regarding the “terrible missiles of destruction” marked a shift in topics for 
Reagan.  During the early stages of the campaign, Reagan took a stance on an issue much 
smaller than nuclear war: the ownership of the Panama Canal.   
REAGAN AND THE PANAMA CANAL  
During the election cycle, there was talk about the U.S. relinquishing possession of the 
Panama Canal.  Reagan‟s view on the ownership of the Canal was absolute.  He had even 
developed a signature tagline for it: “We bought it, we paid for it, we built it, and we intend to 
keep it.”111  The tagline became the trademark Reagan quote for 1976.  He would often repeat it 
in interviews, press conferences, speeches, and any other form of media through which he could 
reach an audience.  In Reagan‟s view, it was not the Canal itself that was at stake; it was 
American superiority and pride, a view shared by the Neoconservatives who later filled his 
administration.   
 The country was still recovering from the war in Vietnam, and many Americans felt as 
though America‟s world standing had taken a beating in the loss.112  For Reagan, the thought that 
the Panama Canal was going to be turned over to the Panamanian government was another 
loss—a loss of pride in post-Vietnam America that could not stand.  Time magazine succinctly 
summarized Reagan‟s views on the Canal and how they were being received by the American 
people: “Reagan‟s jingoism on the canal has apparently struck a nerve among parts of the 
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electorate, arousing post-Vietnam sentiments that the U.S. should not be pushed around in its 
own hemisphere . . ..”113  According to Reagan, the Panama Canal, if handed over to the 
Panamanian government, would only add to a feeling of failure the American people had 
harbored since the loss in Vietnam.  To Reagan, that kind of failure was not acceptable, 
especially to a country that was number one in the world and should be seen as such.   
 As Reagan‟s message of “we intend to keep it” reached a wider audience, many of his 
constituents were aghast by what Reagan projected to the American people.  Senator Barry 
Goldwater (R-AZ), the Republican nominee for president in 1964, bought some television 
airtime to counter Reagan‟s canal message.114  Even Hollywood icon and avid Republican John 
Wayne weighed in on the Reagan-Canal debate, sending Reagan a scathing letter condemning 
his position: ''Now I have taken your letter, and I'll show you point by goddamn point in the 
treaty where you are misinforming people.  If you continue these erroneous remarks, someone 
will publicize your letter to prove that you are not as thorough in your reviewing of this treaty as 
you say or are damned obtuse when it comes to reading the English language.''
115
   
 In a televised debate regarding the Canal with conservative pundit William F. Buckley, 
Reagan reiterated the sound-bite of “We bought it, we paid for it, we built it, and we intend to 
keep it.”  During the nearly two-hour debate, Reagan maintained it was American pride that 
would suffer if the U.S. relinquished the Canal.  As Reagan argued, “We would become a 
laughingstock by surrendering to unreasonable demands, and by doing so, I think we cloak 
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weakness in the suit of virtue.”116  Reagan‟s political strategy and how he attempted to garner 
votes was by invoking the resounding sense of disappointment, embarrassment, and anger that a 
large portion of the American public still harbored about Vietnam.   
Yet what Reagan ignored in his Panama Canal rhetoric was that the negotiations had 
begun long before 1976. In 1964, there was a riot in Panama between Panamanian citizens and 
U.S. residents over the Canal Zone, culminating in a brief diplomatic standstill between the two 
nations.  The understanding that there would be a treaty turning ownership of the Canal over to 
Panama had its roots in 1967; however, turmoil in the Panama, leading to the coup which put 
General Torrijos in power, stalled the negotiations.  In 1973, President Nixon appointed former 
U.S. Ambassador to South Vietnam Ellsworth Bunker to head-up the U.S. delegation in the 
Canal talks.  The objective of the Nixon Administration, and the subsequent goal of the Ford 
Administration, was to ensure continual U.S. use of the Canal, not maintain ownership.  
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger told President Ford in 1975 that if the Canal negotiations 
failed, “We will be beaten to death in every international forum and there will be riots all over 
Latin America.”117   
 While Ford vowed to maintain U.S. use of the Canal during the 1976 campaign, it was 
not just Reagan who criticized his approach.  In a foreign policy debate against Ford, Democratic 
nominee Jimmy Carter took a much more conservative stance than anticipated, stating that he 
would not give up “practical control of the Canal,” while seeking to share sovereignty.118  Weeks 
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after his election, Carter did, however, change his views on the Canal on the advice of many pro-
treaty advisors.  The treaties, which became colloquially known as the Carter-Torrijos Treaties, 
were ratified in October 1977 despite protests from the American Right.
119
   
 The debate over the Canal dated back to the early 1960s, which meant that talks about 
ownership and use of the Canal had been present in American politics for over a decade.  What 
differed, however, in the 1976 election season was the way in which the debate was framed.  
Traditionally, the Canal rhetoric focused on economic consequences of relinquishment.  Many 
opposed to the treaties cited the threat to U.S. economic interests.  The threat of encirclement by 
pro-Communist regimes also became a natural Cold War-era argument.  Changing those 
traditional, static arguments, Reagan made the Canal an issue of pride.  And by equating the loss 
of the Canal to a loss of American pride, the argument became more emotional, more visceral.
120
    
Reagan‟s and his Neoconservative constituents‟ calls of patriotism, American military 
might, and nationalism were not enough to stop the transfer of the Canal, though buried in that 
defeat was a victory: Reagan had tapped into a national sentiment that would carry him to the 
presidency in 1980.  Reagan had been able to gain mass support in the electorate by capitalizing 
on the national feeling of embarrassment surrounding the loss in Vietnam through the issue of 
relinquishing the Panama Canal.  In his book The Reagan I Knew, Reagan‟s one-time Canal 
debate opponent Buckley wrote, “I think that Governor Reagan put his finger on it when he said 
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the reason this treaty is unpopular is because we‟re tired of being pushed around.  We were 
pushed out of Vietnam because we didn‟t have the guts to go in there and do it right.”121  It was 
clear that Reagan had tapped into something much larger than the Canal itself.  He had publically 
professed the same, stifled sentiments many Americans had regarding the failures in Southeast 
Asia.  Reagan‟s promise and determination to restore American pride was an incredibly 
successful political strategy.  With his continued assertions regarding the United States‟ military 
inferiority compared to the U.S.S.R., Reagan further cemented his political niche.   
REAGAN AND HIS PRE-PRESIDENTIAL VIEWS OF THE U.S.S.R. 
 
In the same televised address in which he criticized the Ford Administration‟s stance on 
the Panama Canal during the 1976 election, Reagan also addressed the issue of Soviet 
superiority: 
The Soviet Army outnumbers ours more than two-to-one and in reserves four-to-
one. They out-spend us on weapons by 50 percent. Their Navy outnumbers ours 
in surface ships and submarines two-to-one. We're outgunned in artillery three-to-
one and their tanks outnumber ours four-to-one. Their strategic nuclear missiles 
are larger, more powerful and more numerous than ours. The evidence mounts 
that we are Number Two in a world where it's dangerous, if not fatal, to be second 
best. . . . But peace does not come from weakness or from retreat. It comes from 
the restoration of American military superiority.”122   
  
In retrospect, Reagan‟s statements were, at best, factually shaky.  There was no hard 
evidence at the time—especially none accessible to a former governor of California running for 
President—that could substantiate his claims.  Factual inaccuracies aside, what Reagan had done 
was paint a stark, terrifying picture for the American people.  In a world where the threat of a 
nuclear apocalypse was a paramount concern, being confronted with the “fact” that the U.S. was 
outmanned and outgunned struck a nerve.  Reagan‟s determination to restore American pride, 
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through the use of military might, resonated with voters and the Neoconservative Movement, and 
in 1980, Reagan unseated Jimmy Carter to become the 40
th
 President of the United States.
123
   
REAGAN AND THE START OF U.S. MILITARY BUILD-UP (1981-1983) 
 
 Shortly after Reagan was sworn in as President, he focused his attention on the federal 
budget.  One of his objectives was to ensure that someone could no longer make $150,000 a year 
on welfare, as he had claimed was possible.
124
  Instead, the nation needed to direct its energies 
elsewhere—national defense, which he argued had been neglected.  
Between the 1976 campaign and the 1980 campaign, Reagan was adamant about the 
dangers the country faced as the U.S.S.R. grew “stronger.”  In his first inaugural address, Reagan 
focused on the economy and the inflation Gerald Ford had sought to “whip.”125  Lost in the 
extensive, strong economic rhetoric, however, was an allusion to his plans to build-up America‟s 
military, thus restoring American pride post-Vietnam.  Reagan stated: 
When action is required to preserve our national security, we will act. We will 
maintain sufficient strength to prevail if need be, knowing that if we do so we 
have the best chance of never having to use that strength.  Above all, we must 
realize that no arsenal or no weapon in the arsenals of the world is so formidable 
as the will and moral courage of free men and women. It is a weapon our 
adversaries in today's world do not have. It is a weapon that we as Americans do 
have.
126
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In the last minutes of the speech, Reagan referenced a soldier buried in Arlington National 
Cemetery, who had given his life for the nation‟s fight against tyranny.  As it turned out, the 
soldier who Reagan mentioned—Martin Treptow—was not even buried in Arlington National 
Cemetery; he had been buried in Wisconsin.
127
  That error notwithstanding, Reagan had a 
purpose in telling Treptow‟s story.  He was telling the American people, through the journey of a 
fallen soldier, that American military superiority had to be restored.  The federal budgets 
reflected that desire.  Below is a table which outlines the Reagan Administration‟s budgets, as 
well as Carter‟s for comparison. 
Source: The Office of Management and Budget, Historical Tables, Table 1.3 and Table 8.2 
The numbers show the Reagan Administration increased the federal budget and 
Department of Defense spending every year, which coincided with higher deficits that peaked in 
1983.  Reagan‟s Budget Director David Stockman rang the alarm quite early in the 
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Year Total Federal 
Budget 
Defense 
Spending 
Percentage of 
Budget 
Deficit 
1977 1,320.5 335.6 25.41 173.2 
1978 1,392.7 337.4 24.23 179.7 
1979 1,408.7 348.1 24.71 113.8 
1980 1,494.9 363.0 24.28 186.8 
1981 1,543.9 382.2 24.66 179.8 
1982 1,579.3 414.0 26.21 271.0 
1983 1,630.4 444.6 27.27 419.1 
1984 1,642.8 461.3 28.08 357.5 
1985 1,761.3 493.6 28.02 395.1 
1986 1,805.0 522.4 29.94 403.2 
1987 1,778.9 530.5 29.82 265.3 
1988 1,824.2 533.3 29.23 265.9 
1989 1,887.7 538.3 28.52 251.9 
Table 2-1: Budgets of Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan (in constant 2009, billions of dollars) 
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Administration‟s budget talks.  Stockman warned Reagan about the problems of increased 
deficits, while Reagan continuously reminded those opposed to his budget of what was at stake, 
especially where national security was concerned.   
In his book, The Triumph of Politics: Why the Reagan Revolution Failed, Stockman 
describes a conversation with Reagan concerning the budget.  Quoting Reagan, Stockman wrote, 
“There must be no perception by anyone in the world that we‟re backing down an inch on 
defense buildup.  When I was asked during the campaign about what I would do if it came down 
to a choice between defense and deficits . . . I always said national security has to come first, and 
the people applauded every time.”128 Stockman would resign in 1985 in protest of the growing 
deficits.
129
   
The budget deficits of today skew our interpretations of the Reagan-era budget shortfalls.  
In a decade where a trillion-dollar deficit is not uncommon, the idea that Reagan‟s deficits were 
a couple of hundred billion dollars does not sound as alarming to a modern audience; however, at 
the time, it was the largest peacetime deficit in the nation‟s history.  The Reagan Administration 
had to make a convincing case to the American people why such deficits were necessary.   
 As the Administration argued, the Soviet Union‟s military build-up had forced their hand; 
the United States had to match the Soviets tank-for-tank.  The Administration reminded 
Americans what was at stake: the Soviets were focused on world domination and the 
enslavement of all free people.  Neoconservatives, becoming integral in the Reagan White 
House, argued that the United States needed to portray strength to avoid enemies becoming more 
self-assured.  In a 1981 interview with Walter Cronkite, in which Cronkite suggested that Reagan 
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might have been exaggerating Soviet intentions in order to gain support for his budget, Reagan 
stated: 
. . . [N]othing is immoral if it furthers their cause, which means they can resort to 
lying or stealing or cheating or even murder if it furthers their cause, and that is 
not immoral. Now, if we're going to deal with them, then we have to keep that in 
mind when we deal with them.
130
 
 
Invoking morality in times of war was nothing new in American politics, but Reagan‟s use of 
morality to justify military spending in a time of peace added a new facet to the discussion.  The 
same year, the U.S. Department of Defense released a booklet entitled Soviet Military Power.
131
  
In it, the DoD outlined the Soviets‟ advancements and warned of the consequences if the United 
States did not keep pace.  Questioning the timing of its release, Time magazine noted, “Its 
purpose [is to] send a red alert to Americans and their allies that the U.S.S.R. is gaining a 
military edge over the West. Naturally, there was suspicion that the timing was designed to help 
the Pentagon justify the vast sums needed for the new strategic defense systems.”132   
Shortly after Reagan‟s Defense Department had released the provocative booklet, Soviet 
Premier Leonid Brezhnev called for Reagan to join him in “rejecting the very idea of nuclear 
attack as criminal.”  Brezhnev went on to state, “It is dangerous madness to try to defeat each 
other in the arms race and to count on victory in nuclear war.  I shall add that only he who has 
decided to commit suicide can start a nuclear war in the hope of emerging a victor.”133  Brezhnev 
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could not be believed; Reagan was confident that the Soviets thought nuclear war was 
winnable.
134
  
Despite the amount of money spent on the nation‟s defense and the deficits it was 
creating, a majority of the American people supported Reagan‟s efforts to out-spend the Soviets 
on military necessities.  The Gallup poll below shows the public sentiments towards defense 
spending: 
 
Chart 2-1. Source: Gallup, “Americans Remain Divided on Defense Spending,” February 5, 2011. 
The graph shows that in 1981, while the Reagan Administration was adamant that the Soviets 
were outspending the United States, an overwhelming majority of Americans believed that the 
U.S. was spending too little on defense.  In other words, the Reagan Administration‟s argument 
had a tangible effect on the way Americans viewed the Soviets‟ military superiority and 
supported increased defense spending to keep pace.   
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 As has been seen in the 2000s, what are usually lost in the talks about defense spending 
are the consequences it had on the United States domestically.  As political scientist Anne 
Hessing Cahn wrote in 1993: 
For more than a third of a century, assertions of Soviet superiority created calls 
for the United States to „re-arm.‟ In the 1980s, the call was heeded so thoroughly 
that the United States embarked on a trillion dollar defense buildup.  As a result, 
the country neglected its schools, cities, roads and bridges and health care system.  
From the world‟s greatest creditor nation, the United States became the world‟s 
greatest debtor—in order to pay for the arms to counter the threat of a nation that 
was collapsing.
135
 
 
Perhaps Cahn unfairly blames the Reagan Administration for not knowing about the Soviet 
Union‟s impending collapse, but her point is well made.  It is troublesome that the deficits were 
not a result of increased spending on education, healthcare, or infrastructure, but it is important 
to realize that the threat of the Soviet Union was real to millions of people.  And because of that 
fear, defense spending that created deficits was more palatable.  In October 1983, after all of the 
debate about spending, deficits, and the like, the Reagan Administration got to prove the benefits 
of having America‟s improved and costly military.   
THE UNITED STATES INVASION OF GRENADA 
In October 1983, the United States launched a full-scale invasion of the tiny island-nation 
of Grenada.  Codenamed “Operation Urgent Fury,” it was the first opportunity for the Reagan 
Administration to confront Communism, or what they deemed Communism, militarily, with the 
world watching.  After the government of Grenada was overthrown in a Marxist coup, Reagan 
became increasingly concerned about the Cuban influence—and by extension, the Soviet 
influence—in the hemisphere.  Promoted as a rescue mission of the American students studying 
medicine at the American owned and operated St. George‟s University (like Jimmy Carter‟s 
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secret mission to save hostages in Iran), Operation Urgent Fury was not without its blunders.  
More so than its shortcomings, what is most historically important about the mission is the 
secrecy with which it was undertaken.  Under the War Powers Resolution Act of 1973 as 
discussed in Chapter One, an invasion of a sovereign country could not be Reagan‟s decision 
alone; Congress had to approve.  Instead of asking Congress for the go-ahead, however, Reagan 
facilitated the invasion on his own accord (largely from the Augusta National Golf Course), 
ignoring the checks to presidential power Congress had attempted to instill in a post-Vietnam 
America.   
PLANNING AND SECRECY 
During the planning of the operation, the Reagan Administration was adamant about 
keeping the invasion of Grenada a secret.  There could be no hint that the United States was 
coming.  As a result of the secrecy, many of prerequisites for invasion were ignored.  In fact, 
even as the invasion was underway, U.S. troops were using tourist maps to navigate the island, 
instead of the tactical maps the Defense Department could have supplied with its ever-growing 
budget.
136
  Reagan was concerned that the more people were aware of the impending invasion 
(like map makers in the Pentagon), the more likely it was that information about the invasion 
would surface.  President Reagan did not even warn his closest ally British Prime Minister 
Margaret Thatcher of the invasion, despite the compelling fact that Grenada was a member of the 
British Commonwealth.  After the operation was underway, Thatcher was understandably 
furious. Reagan called the Prime Minister to apologize: 
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Reagan:  We regret very much the embarrassment caused you . . ..We have had a 
nagging problem of a loose source, a leak here. . . . Incidentally, let me tell you 
that we were being so careful here that we did not even give a firm answer to the 
Caribbean States. We told them we were planning, but we were so afraid of this 
source and what it would do; it could almost abort the mission, with the lives that 
could have endangered. 
 
Thatcher: I know about sensitivity, because of the Falklands. . . . The action is 
underway now and we just hope it will be successful.
137
 
 
Thatcher may not have been thrilled that she was left out of the loop regarding the invasion, but 
she understood the importance of secrecy.  As Reagan saw it, if the operation was going to 
succeed, information had to be on a need-to-know basis.  For that reason, the Administration also 
made the decision to not inform the press corps about the invasion.   
 In 1987, former White House spokesman Larry Speakes told the New York Times that 
Vice Admiral and Deputy National Security Advisor John Poindexter was told to lie about the 
impending invasion.  Citing direct instructions from White House Chief of Staff James Baker, 
III, Speakes recalled that he and Poindexter told reporters that the rumors of an invasion were 
“preposterous.”  Baker later responded to Speakes‟ accusations in an interview with the New 
York Times: “I never told John Poindexter to tell Larry Speakes that it was preposterous. I might 
well have told John Poindexter and others that they might not talk about this and the press office 
should not be briefed because American lives were at stake, as they indeed were.''
138
  It was not 
just the press that could not know about the Grenada invasion.  Congress, too, could not be 
informed of the Reagan Administration‟s plans, because as a natural extension of the adopted 
plan, a 535-member legislative body was not conducive to secrecy.  
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CONGRESS’ OBJECTIONS TO REAGAN’S MILITARY ADVENTURISM 
 Even before the invasion of Grenada, Congress and Reagan, in 1982, had a showdown 
over the funds the Reagan Administration was diverting to help efforts overthrow the leftist 
government, or Sandinistas, in Nicaragua, though the Reagan Administration and its allies would 
label the government “Marxist” or “Communist” in order to emphasize the need for its 
overthrow.  The disagreement culminated in the passage of the Boland Amendment.  Under this 
law, “No funds available to the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense or any 
other agency or entity of the United States involved in intelligence activities may be obligated or 
expended for the purpose or which would have the effect of supporting, directly or indirectly, 
military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua by any nation, group, organization, movement 
or individual.”139  Congress was adamant that the Reagan Administration‟s diversion of funds to 
subvert leftist efforts in Latin America had to stop.  In his autobiography, Reagan wrote about a 
conversation with Speaker of the House Tip O‟Neill regarding Congress‟ efforts to keep aid from 
Nicaragua: “The Sandinistas have openly proclaimed Communism in their country and their 
support of Marxist revolutions throughout Central America. . . . They‟re killing and torturing 
people! Now what does Congress expect me to do about that?”140  To Reagan, secrecy regarding 
the invasion of Grenada was a preventative measure, ensuring another Boland Amendment 
would not end the plan before its inception.  In order to guarantee minimal interference from 
Congress in, Reagan understandably did not tell them.   
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 Known for his persuasive oratory, Reagan addressed the nation to talk about the budget, 
the Department of Defense, and the looming threat of the militarization of Grenada.  During the 
speech, Reagan addressed the concerns of Congress and the American people about the increased 
budget and deficit.  Arguing in defense of his spending, Reagan stated: “In 1955 defense took up 
more than half of the Federal budget. By 1980 this spending had fallen to a low of 23 percent. 
Even with the increase that I am requesting this year, defense will still amount to only 28 percent 
of the budget.”141  The public could not argue with numbers.  After all, President Eisenhower let 
the Department of Defense budget claim 50 percent of the budget, nearly double what Reagan 
was asking for.  To further illustrate his point, Reagan reminded the nation of the Soviet and 
Cuban threat, especially pertaining to Grenada: 
On the small island of Grenada, at the southern end of the Caribbean chain, the 
Cubans, with Soviet financing and backing, are in the process of building an 
airfield with a 10,000-foot runway. Grenada doesn't even have an air force. Who 
is it intended for?  The Soviet-Cuban militarization of Grenada, in short, can only 
be seen as power projection into the region.
142
  
 
The airstrip was an issue of particular importance.  Reagan‟s ominous, rhetorical question was 
meant to leave the American people with the impression that it was a devious plot by the 
Communists.  Scholarship on the subject suggests that the airstrip was simply meant for 
commercial use.  In her book, Masters of War: Latin America and the U.S. Aggression from the 
Cuban Revolution to the Clinton Years, historian Clara Nieto states that the United States was the 
first country Grenada approached for assistance in building the airstrip, but the Reagan 
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Administration declined.
143
  Former official at the State Department and critic of U.S. foreign 
policy William Blum explains other omissions in Reagan‟s speech:  
At least five other Caribbean islands, including Barbados, had similar-sized or 
larger airfields yet did not possess air forces.  The building of the airfield was 
encouraged by the World Bank, which also discussed with Grenada the erection 
of new tourist hotels.  The excavation work was being done by the Layne 
Dredging Co. of Florida and the communications system installed by Plessey, a 
British multinational, the Cubans donating labor and machinery.  Plessey rejected 
the US claim: „the airport . . . was being built to purely civilian specifications,‟ it 
said, and listed a number of technical characteristics of a military airport/base 
which the new airport would not have.
144
 
 
It was not just Blum‟s retrospective analysis that declared the airstrip as a non-threat.  In 1982, 
testifying before the House‟s Subcommittee on Foreign Affairs, Congressman Ron Dellums 
(CA-D) said after a fact-finding trip to Grenada, “. . . [I]t is my conclusion that this project is 
specifically now and has always been for the purpose of economic development and is not for 
military use.”145  The airstrip may have been Reagan‟s “smoking gun,” proving Communist 
actions in the country, but he would later be criticized for inaccuracies and secrecy regarding the 
invasion.  In a New York Times article, Reagan was chastised by Congressional leaders for his 
lack of transparency on the issue.
146
 Exasperated from not being informed of the invasion and 
Reagan‟s proclivity for war, Senator Lawton Chiles (D-FL), said, “Are we looking for a war we 
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can win?”147   It was not just Congress that was angered by the invasion; the United Nations 
Security Council issued a resolution “deeply deploring” the United States‟ action in Grenada.148   
In an article appearing in the New York Times, journalist William Safire wrote about the 
Reagan Administration‟s secrecy during the weeks prior to the invasion of Grenada.  Safire 
wrote, “The fuss was about telling the truth to the people. The United States Government may on 
rare occasion fall silent for a time, but it must not deliberately lie; only the presence of reporters 
pledged to temporary secrecy can help justify a news blackout.”149   
 When planes with the American “hostages” from Grenada landed in the United States, 
one of the rescued U.S. citizens famously kissed the tarmac.  After that scene was replayed over 
and over again on all media outlets, condemnation of the invasion receded.   In an effort to 
capitalize on the public relations victory the kiss provided, Reagan spoke to the American people 
about the successful mission in Grenada:  
The events in Lebanon and Grenada, though oceans apart, are closely related. Not 
only has Moscow assisted and encouraged the violence in both countries, but it 
provides direct support through a network of surrogates and terrorists. It is no 
coincidence that when the thugs tried to wrest control over Grenada, there were 
30 Soviet advisers and hundreds of Cuban military and paramilitary forces on the 
island.
150
 
 
After Reagan‟s speech, a poll showed that a majority of Americans believed that the Americans 
on Grenada were in danger, and that Reagan made the right decision by extricating them by 
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force.
151
  To Americans, Lebanon, Grenada, and the Soviet Union were now all interconnected.  
The merits of that can be debated, but the precedent of secrecy in Reagan‟s invasion of Grenada 
is the most lasting legacy of the short-lived conflict.  Reagan‟s press blackout, no warning to 
U.S.‟ allies, not asking Congress for permission all culminated in a war undertaken by a single 
man; a direct violation of the War Powers Resolution and the founding idea of the Republic.   
BACKLASH AND PRAISE OF THE INVASION 
 It was hard for anyone in the Reagan Administration to make the case that the tiny island 
nation of Grenada qualified as a direct and imminent threat to national security as would have to 
be the excuse for Reagan‟s invasion of Grenada without Congressional approval.152  Congress 
did take measures to ensure that the Reagan Administration would follow the provisions of the 
War Powers Act that were still left after the invasion was already in effect.
153
  The House passed 
a resolution mandating that the clause of the War Powers Act which stated that U.S. forces could 
not be deployed to another country for more than sixty days without permission from Congress 
was followed.
154
  This was Congress‟s attempt to re-establish itself as the war-making branch 
following the secrecy of the initial invasion.   
In an interview with the New York Times, Speaker of the House Tip O‟Neill condemned 
Reagan: 
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I don't like where we're going one bit. I'm frightened, not because our nation isn't 
big enough, but because the President of the United States, in my opinion, is 
absolutely going down the wrong road. . . . You can't justify any government 
whether it's Russia or the United States, trampling on another nation. I'm worried 
about the effects of this. . . . He (the President) is wrong in his policy. He's caused 
us continuous harm. . . . He has no knowledge or no talent of the things that are 
happening out there.
155
 
 
Given the barrage of personal insults O‟Neill later made towards President Reagan (and even 
Nancy Reagan) in the interview, it was clear that he was livid about what had transpired.  Dick 
Cheney, then a Congressman from Wyoming, third ranking Republican in the House, and 
leading Neoconservative, praised Reagan‟s Grenada campaign saying, “A lot of folks around the 
world feel we are more steady and reliable than heretofore.''
156
     
 Aided by the constant replay of the American from Grenada kissing the tarmac and the 
resounding success of the operation, Reagan‟s ignoring of the law fell through the cracks; it was 
a massive victory for the Administration, especially in terms of public opinion.  The number of 
U.S. casualties was low—19 deaths, 17 from friendly-fire, and 116 wounded—and the U.S. 
accomplished its goals in a week.
157
  It was not just the Soviet-centric mentality that the United 
States had addressed with the success of Grenada.  The ghost of Vietnam was partly exorcised.  
In his book The Long Gray Line: The American Journey of West Point’s Class of 1966, journalist 
Rick Atkinson noted the effect Grenada had in the minds of Americans from the Vietnam era: 
For all of its shortcomings . . . the invasion of Grenada was a victory. . . . After 
Grenada, soldiers walked a little taller, not because of their battlefield exploits but 
because of the huzzahs from the rescued students and an appreciative citizenry at 
home.  The United States Army, its self-esteem battered in Southeast Asia, 
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needed to win a war, any war.  That slender campaign from Grenada buried 
beneath it the seventeen preceding ribbons from Vietnam.
158
 
 
With the ghost of Vietnam being silenced for a short time, the Reagan Administration‟s publicly-
known military adventures came to a close.  The DoD budget continued to go up, but Americans 
were not being sent abroad, which critics questioned.  Following Grenada, the Administration 
did engage in military adventures abroad, however, of which the public and Congress remained 
unaware. 
In 1987, the scandal which almost prematurely ended the Reagan presidency with 
impeachment came to light.  It involved the counterrevolutionaries in Nicaragua that Congress 
said (via the 1982 and 1984 Boland Amendments) Reagan could no longer fund.  According to 
Reagan, Congress, as was the case with Grenada, did not understand the severity of the situation, 
thus the reason for secrecy—in addition to the overwhelming fact that the Administration was on 
shaky legal ground.  In what became known as the Iran-Contra Scandal, Reagan‟s refusal to 
acknowledge Congressional authority marred the last two years of his presidency with 
investigations and hearings.  Though Reagan avoided impeachment, the precedent that the 
President could lead on issues of foreign policy pertaining to war was only strengthened. 
REAGAN AND THE IRAN-CONTRA SCANDAL 
 The Iran-Contra Scandal stemmed from Reagan‟s dissatisfaction with the Legislative 
Branch‟s insistence on checking his presidential prerogatives and curtailing his foreign policy 
agenda.  As Reagan argued, there were certain matters of national security that the President 
“knew” that were impossible for Congress to know.  He met with military officials, CIA 
officials, National Security Advisors, foreign dignitaries, and a vast network of informants every 
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single day.  Because he was privy to that information, he understood the dangers the United 
States faced better than anyone; he had the most information to make the best decisions.  Based 
on that understanding, Reagan made a logical, coherent argument.  So when Congress passed the 
second Boland Amendment in 1984 stating that the CIA or any other intelligence agency could 
not divert their allocated funds to support the anti-leftist Contras in Nicaragua, the 
Administration sought to circumvent that piece of legislation.  In the rationale of the Reagan 
White House, the Executive Branch understood more about what was at stake in Latin America 
than did the 535 members of Congress, because those members of Congress were not privy to 
daily intelligence briefings.
159
   
 To contextualize the implications of the Scandal, some background information is 
needed.  In the mid-1980s, four American hostages were being held in Lebanon.  Using Israel as 
a middle-man the U.S. supplied Iranian moderates (by way of shady businessman Manucher 
Ghorbanifar) with arms in order to secure the hostages‟ release.  The money made from the arms 
sales would be sent to Nicaragua to help the Contras‟ efforts against the leftist Sandinistas.160  
The Reagan Administration successfully found a loophole in the Boland Amendment, effectively 
continuing its monetary support of the Contras.  The ad-hoc reason the Reagan Administration 
gave for the transactions continued to establish a precedent in American war-making politics, 
while maintaining that the Executive was the preeminent authority on issues of foreign policy.     
THE REASONS AND SECRECY OF THE IRAN-CONTRA SCANDAL 
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 The first Boland Amendment was passed in 1982 (which said no interference by the U.S. 
in Latin America), and since its passage, Reagan continued to rationalize with the American 
people the reasons interventions in Latin America were necessary.  In an address to the nation on 
May 9, 1984, Reagan was adamant about the threat of Communism in region: “If the Soviet 
Union can aid and abet subversion in our hemisphere, then the United States has a legal right and 
moral duty to help resist it.”161  The American people, however, were not to be swayed on this 
issue.  Perplexed by his unusual inability to persuade the public and calling for better 
“education” on the topic, Reagan wrote in his diary, “Our communications on Nicaragua have 
been a failure, 90% of the people know it is a communist country but almost as many do not 
want us to give the $14 million for weapons.  I have to believe it is the old Vietnam 
syndrome.”162  After a meeting with Congressional leaders regarding the situation, Reagan 
wrote, “The meetings went well & I think I answered some of their worries.  It‟s apparent though 
that the lack of support on the part of the people due to the drum beat of propaganda „a la 
Vietnam‟ is influencing some of them.”163  Although he was hopeful that he could persuade 
Congress, it was later clear that it, too, would not budge on this issue.  Members of Congress felt 
as though they had not been asked about the invasion of Grenada; they had instead just been 
informed.  They were attempting to ensure that did not happen again in Latin America. 
 Reagan bemoaned what he saw as Congress‟s power play:  
In the last ten years, the Congress has imposed about 150 restrictions on the 
President‟s power in international diplomacy, and I think that the Constitution 
made it pretty plain way back in the beginning as to how diplomacy was to be 
conducted. And I just don‟t think that a committee of 535 individuals, no matter 
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how well intentioned, can offer what is needed in actions of this kind or where 
there‟s a necessity.  Do you know that prior to the Vietnamese War, while this 
country had four declared wars Presidents of this country had found it necessary 
to use military forces 125 times in our history?
164
 
It was a rhetorical question, but Reagan was making a sound, coherent point based on historical 
evidence.  The United States‟ diplomacy, according to him, could not function properly if 
Congress got involved in every little detail of foreign relations.  It was simply impossible to 
consult the 535 members of Congress on everything that a nation such as the United States dealt 
with internationally.  But, what President Reagan failed to comprehend was that Congress was 
doing exactly what the Founding Fathers had envisioned and what the Republic had attempted to 
achieve as a result of independence.  War is costly (both in materiel and lives), time-consuming, 
and too large of a decision for one man to make; its effects, in some sense, had cost King George 
III the American colonies.  By ensuring that hundreds of individuals‟ opinions would have to be 
heard, the Founding Fathers made war the least likely form of diplomacy to succeed.  Congress‟s 
assertion of power on Nicaragua worked exactly as the system was designed.   
 When intelligence leaked that the CIA had been meddling in Nicaraguan harbors, the 
Senate Intelligence Committee Chairman Senator Barry Goldwater (R-AZ) wrote to CIA 
Director William Casey, “I am pissed off! . . . This is an act violating international law.  It is an 
act of war.  For the life of me, I don‟t see how we are going to explain it.”165  In the 
appropriations of the Defense budget, Congress had been explicit about the Reagan 
Administration not helping the Contras.
166
  Congress invited Reagan to ask them for their 
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permission, and in effect, make his case as to why the intervention directly benefitted the United 
States.  Reagan‟s resolve was only strengthened, insisting that Congress was just making a 
power-play in attempts to stave off another Vietnam.  Invoking the debate surrounding American 
troops in Lebanon following the bombing of the Marine barracks, Reagan stated, “A debate as 
public as was conducted here, raging, with the Congress demanding, „Oh, bring our men home, 
take them away.‟ . . . It should be understood by everyone in government that once this is 
committed, you have rendered [our military] ineffective when you conduct that kind of debate in 
public.”167  Public debate about the use of the military, according to Reagan, was unnecessary, 
even detrimental.  This rationale was the antithesis to the ideas of warring at the country‟s 
inception. 
 The Iranian Hostage Crisis, just a few years removed, was still fresh in the minds of the 
Reagan Administration when hostages were taken in Lebanon.  The Administration had seen 
what Carter‟s inability to free the hostages did to his public opinion numbers and his presidency; 
they were determined to handle this hostage crisis more effectively.  So, when an opportunity 
presented itself to free the hostages (albeit under illegal terms), the Administration seized on the 
opportunity.  The convoluted plot broke several laws Congress passed to impugn presidential 
authority, and it was clear that Reagan knew this.  During the planning stages of the arms-for-
hostage plan, Reagan wrote in his diary: “I would not even write it up in this diary what we are 
up to.”168   
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DISCOVERY AND DENIABILITY 
 Congress eventually caught on that the Reagan Administration was somehow getting 
money to the Contras; the plot was so ill-conceived that it was only a matter of time.  When 
asked, the Administration flat-out lied.  National Security Advisor Bud McFarlane said, “None 
of us has solicited funds, facilitated contacts for prospective potential donors, or otherwise 
organized or coordinated the military or paramilitary efforts of the resistance.”169  After the 
Tower Commission concluded that the Reagan Administration had in fact traded arms for 
hostages, Time published a scathing article criticizing Reagan: 
. . . [T]he President has consistently and vehemently denied that the U.S. was 
swapping arms for hostages, though the voluminous record assembled by the 
Tower commission leaves no question that that is what happened. . . . The 
President who did not understand that arms-for-hostages swaps, in the 
commission‟s words, „ran directly counter to the Administration‟s own policies 
on terrorism‟ is the same Reagan who had never admitted, probably even to 
himself, that his tax and spending programs were bound to result in gargantuan 
budget deficits.
170
 
Attorney General Ed Meese was the most successful in making sure that Reagan avoided 
impeachment.  Meese stated that because the arms-for-hostages negotiations were facilitated by 
members of the National Security Council (not the CIA, DoD, or other agencies historically 
considered to be intelligence agencies), the law was not broken.  According to Meese, the 
language of the Boland Amendment left a big loophole for the Reagan Administration.
171
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Because the NSC had never been considered an intelligence agency, and the Boland Amendment 
only prohibited intelligence agencies from assisting the Contras, no one had violated the law.
172
 
 Reagan may have been spared impeachment, but he certainly took a beating in the press 
and from his constituents.  Future Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich, at the time a Republican 
congressman from Georgia, would say, “He will never again be the Reagan that he was before he 
blew it.  He is not going to regain our trust and our faith easily.”173  But, not everyone 
condemned Reagan for the scandal.  In the minority report signed by four Republican 
Congressmen and two Republican Senators, author Dick Cheney wrote: 
This history speaks volumes about the Constitution‟s allocation of powers 
between the branches.  It leaves little, if any, doubt that the President was 
expected to have the primary role of conduction of the foreign policy of the 
United States.  Congressional actions to limit the President in this area therefore 
should be reviewed with a considerable degree of skepticism.  If they interfere 
with core presidential foreign policy functions, they should be struck down.  
Moreover, the lesson of our constitutional history is that doubtful cases should be 
decided in favor of the President.
174
   
And it was not just Dick Cheney who supported the President and presidential prerogatives.  The 
newly influential political faction, Neoconservatism, had cut its teeth in the Reagan White 
House.  The Reagan Administration, with its anti-Communist fervor, assertions of presidential 
prerogative, and insistence on military build-ups, helped the Neoconservative Movement, which 
would influence American foreign policy for the next two decades, hone its ideas.   
REAGAN AND THE NEOCONSERVATIVES 
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As mentioned in Chapter One, the Neoconservative Movement has been defined by a 
myopic foreign policy agenda; in short, the expansion of American democracy.  During the Cold 
War, the threat of Communism was the basis for their ideas, and in the Reagan White House, the 
basis for their influence.  Writing for Commentary Magazine and published by American 
Enterprise Institute, the leading Neoconservative think-tank, columnist Jeane Kirkpatrick wrote 
in 1979 of the Carter Administration‟s failures in diplomacy: 
The U.S. has never tried so hard and failed so utterly to make and keep friends in 
the Third World. . . . Where once upon a time an American President might have 
sent Marines to assure the protection of American strategic interests, there is no 
room for force in this world of progress and self-determination. Force, the 
President told us at Notre Dame, does not work; that is the lesson he extracted 
from Vietnam. It offers only “superficial” solutions.175 
Kirkpatrick lamented the United States‟ passivity in foreign affairs.  She highlighted many of the 
key positions associated with the Neoconservative Movement: use of military force, dealing with 
the threat of an enemy, America‟s role in the world, and the influence of Vietnam in America‟s 
consciousness.  Kirkpatrick obviously disagreed with Carter‟s foreign policy platform, but her 
usage of those Neoconservative ideals gives some context for the movement as a whole.  In an 
article entitled, “Strategic Parallels . . . And Perplexities,” she wrote, “Our world cannot resolve 
moral issues by submitting them to the judgment of dictators. The legitimacy of a military action 
must be judged by the morality of the situation, not by the Security Council.”176   
Advocating the use of the military to answer the world‟s problems is one of the critiques 
many have of the Neoconservative Movement.  The assumption that a strong military force can 
solve any problem does not hold up under stronger inspection, but that did not deter the 
Neoconservatives from pontificating that idea as an acceptable course of action.  Reagan 
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seemingly approved of the Neoconservatives‟ notions, highlighted by Kirkpatrick.  Jeane 
Kirkpatrick served on his National Security Council, as well as his Ambassador to the United 
Nations.  Those combative, direct foreign policy ideas were understood in the Reagan 
Administration‟s fight against Communism.   
It was not just the idea of military interventionism around the world or American 
superiority that Neoconservatives championed in the Reagan years.  Reagan‟s constant reliance 
on the military, coupled with Congressional backlash, also gave the Neoconservative Movement 
a cause around which they build a coalition: presidential prerogative.  The Neoconservatives 
argued, like Reagan, that they understood what was at stake.  Communism had to be stopped and 
America had to lead, not shirk from its global responsibilities.  Congress was too weak, clunky, 
and knotty to address the issues with the ferocity they deserved.   
At the annual American Enterprise Institute Dinner, former Deputy Secretary of Defense 
and co-founder of Hewlett-Packard David Packard spoke about the intersection of the Executive 
Branch and the Legislative Branch in American politics, “There is no rational system whereby 
the executive branch and the Congress reach coherent and enduring agreement on national 
military strategy. . . . The absence of such a system contributes substantially to the instability and 
uncertainty that plague our defense program.”177  Effectively, Packard argued that the Executive 
and the Congress cannot both make decisions regarding use of the military.  Instead of urging the 
branches to work together, he maintained that it was impossible.  In 1986, while Reagan was 
insistent on keeping Congress uninformed about his dealings involving Iran and Nicaragua, this 
sentiment only added to the argument that the President was endowed with certain authorities.  
Logically, it is easier for one man to make the decision than it is for 535 people to agree; it was 
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exactly what Dick Cheney had argued in his Minority Report of the Tower Commission in 1987.   
The notion that Packard dismisses, however, is exactly the way the country was designed to 
handle matters of war.  Many people with differing, strong opinions should make the decision to 
go to war to ensure all other alternatives have been considered.   
 Political scientist and professor emeritus at Georgetown University Walter Berns wrote at 
the height of the Iran-Contra Scandal, “Congress often defines any action taken without their 
approval as an abuse.”178  Berns‟s analysis certainly glosses over the illegality of the Iran-Contra 
Scandal, but his point of view was shared by numerous people.  Just like Reagan was bemoaning 
Congressional interference, Berns saw Congressional attempts to check presidential power as 
petty.  What Berns failed to realize is that Congress‟s attempts to check Reagan in the late 1980s 
was not pettiness or retribution; it was their job.  A president, no matter how well-intentioned he 
might have been, could not authorize illegal activities to circumvent Congressional will.   
 The number of writings done by the Neoconservatives during this time is striking.  Using 
the American Enterprise Institute as a database, some quick searches determined the kinds of 
things written about during the Reagan years.
179
  What the numbers show is that the 
Neoconservative Movement overwhelmingly wrote on the virtues of Reagan‟s defense plans, but 
when it came to controversial or misguided adventures, they were not apt to write about those.  
More strikingly, adding to the arguments that Reagan‟s popularity exploded in his post-
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presidency years, the Neoconservatives wrote significantly less about Reagan during his actual 
tenure; in fact, the writings on Reagan after he left office grew an astonishing 3,200 percent.    
   Neoconservatives were not just writing about Reagan‟s policies; they helped shape 
them.  As mentioned above, Jeane Kirkpatrick served in the Administration, but so did a number 
of notable Neoconservatives.  Richard Pipes, Russian historian at Harvard, who wrote a hugely 
exaggerated article entitled “Why the Soviet Union Thinks It Could Fight and Win a Nuclear 
War,” served as Reagan‟s Director of East European and Soviet Affairs on his National Security 
Council.  Richard Perle, who had served with Pipes on the Team B Committee, was Reagan‟s 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Strategic Affairs.
180
  Paul Wolfowitz served as 
Director of Policy Planning, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs, and 
Ambassador to Indonesia all under Reagan.  Neoconservatives were not just idly watching the 
Reagan Administration.  The tough-on-Communism restoration of American military superiority 
mentality of Reagan was further strengthened by his decision to fill his administration with those 
who shared those convictions.  While speaking at the annual American Enterprise Institute 
dinner in 1988, Reagan joked—though it is telling—“Of course, it would be a massive 
understatement to say I see a lot of familiar faces in this room. In fact, for a minute I thought I 
had stumbled into the White House mess.”181  The Neoconservative influence would carry over 
into the next administration, and thus into America‟s next conflict: the First Gulf War. 
CONCLUSION 
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 When Ronald Reagan first ran for President in 1976, he was determined to restore 
American pride in the post-Vietnam era.  Taking hard-line stances on the ownership of the 
Panama Canal, the necessity of military build-up, Communism, and American global superiority, 
Reagan was a stark contrast to most politicians in the country, who had decided that Vietnam 
was the end of America‟s military adventurism for an indefinite period of time.  With his 
excellent oratory, likeability, and patriotic ideas, Reagan earned the presidency twice, creating 
the “Age of Reagan.”   
 What is more important about the Age of Reagan, however, is the tangible effect it had 
on America‟s foreign policy directives.  Reagan‟s insistence on increasing military spending, 
lone decision to invade Grenada, and his Iran-Contra initiative set the precedent for the next two 
decades of foreign policy.  Presidents were now more confident than ever before about their 
leadership role in matters of war.  Congressional approval was no longer seen as necessary, but 
as an advantage.  An official in the George H.W. Bush White House would later say during the 
First Gulf War that the administration would seek “support” from Congress, not permission.  The 
decade of the 1980s gave administrations more power in war-making than any previous decade, 
and the fall of the U.S.S.R. only reinforced the idea that global military adventurism, which had 
been largely approved by the President, was a successful diplomatic strategy.   
 The successes of the Reagan Administration, arguably skewed by the fall of the Soviet 
Union, also led to an increase of power in the Neoconservative Movement.  As the driving 
ideology of the Reagan Administration—the administration that had successfully defeated the 
Soviets—Neoconservative ideas gained more political capital and viability.  Soon, as will be 
seen in the next chapter, more Neoconservatives gained prominent positions in administrations, 
especially in foreign policy circles.  With the First Gulf War and the strategies for the post-Cold 
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War promoted by Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, the Neoconservative Movement 
fundamentally changed the way America viewed its world standing and effectively changed the 
way the United States went to war.   
 The interventions in Latin America, which had been wholly supported by 
Neoconservatives, were not the only instances that would greatly affect the U.S.‟ foreign policy 
objectives for the next two decades.  The Latin American interventions did lead to an increase in 
presidential authority, while the simultaneous support for the Mujahedeen in Afghanistan to 
combat the Soviets and support for Saddam Hussein in the Iran-Iraq War would directly affect 
the country‟s diplomacy for the next twenty years.  In those cases, Neoconservatives supported 
the Mujahedeen‟s fight against the U.S.‟ Cold War rival and remained steadfast in their 
opposition to Iran, advocating for aid to be sent to Iraq.  In an ironic twist, Neoconservatives 
would spearhead campaigns to invade both countries—Iraq twice—in the following years.   
 The Neoconservative Movement in the George H.W. Bush Administration did have its 
setbacks.  There were critics and controversies as the Administration sought to engage in the first 
major land war since Vietnam and comparable in terms of the number of troops it would require.  
Requiring that type of military build-up did not come cheaply, and the attempts to dissuade the 
country from going to war were evident.  The Abrams Doctrine, which had remained unaffected 
by the small skirmishes of the Reagan era, reached a new level of importance, while the War 
Powers Resolution continued to lose its viability.  And it was in the George H.W. Bush White 
House that all three of the post-Vietnam reactions, detailed at the outset of this thesis, converged 
to permanently alter America‟s foreign policy.   
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CHAPTER THREE 
GEORGE H.W. BUSH, THE FIRST GULF WAR, AND MILITARY 
PRIVATIZATION 
 
“If we sought congressional involvement [for the First Gulf War], it would not be 
authority we were after, but support.”182 
--Brent Scowcroft, National Security Advisor to President George H.W. Bush 
INTRODUCTION 
 National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft, in the quote above, is articulating the George 
H.W. Bush Administration‟s thoughts regarding the powers of war after Saddam Hussein‟s 
invasion of Kuwait in 1990.  His sentiments reflect the culmination of the attitudes and policies 
discussed in the first two chapters of this thesis.  The Neoconservative influence reached its 
strongest point during the H.W. Bush presidency.  Though the political ideology has become 
more associated with the George W. Bush Administration, many of the ideas first proposed by 
Neoconservatives, such as military privatization, increased interventions abroad, and the 
expansion of American democracy have their roots in the 1990s, but their consequences extend 
beyond that decade.   
 The Abrams Doctrine, which was created to make decisions about going to war more 
difficult, saw its first practical applications during the First Gulf War between 1990 and 1991, as 
the Bush Administration, under the advice of General Colin Powell, was authorizing a contingent 
U.S. force of 500,000 troops to forcibly remove Saddam Hussein from Kuwait.  The Abrams 
Doctrine‟s interweaving of Reservists into military forces made the Bush Administration 
consider all alternative routes before making the decision to take the country to war.  
 Not only did the Abrams Doctrine have its first uses in the Bush Administration, but it 
also saw its demise during the same time.  With the idea of privatization of the military, 
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pioneered by then Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, the Abrams Doctrine lost its potency 
because Reservists—as well as a large portion of active duty troops required for military 
action—were replaced by private contractors.  In essence, the government could hire contractors 
to facilitate certain support functions that had been previously undertaken by soldiers, thus 
minimizing the number of U.S. forces being sent abroad in times of conflict.   
 The War Powers Resolution, which had begun to lose its viability in the Reagan White 
House, continued to be a hotly contested issue in the H.W. Bush Administration.  Worried about 
the precedent that it might set if he asked for Congress‟s permission to wage war against 
Saddam, President Bush attempted to find every escapable route in order to avoid the ask.  
Congressional officials were adamant that the President needed their permission, while Bush 
thought he needed their support.  The power of the resolution was ultimately, in a roundabout 
way, adhered to, as explained below.  In the end, the country did decide to go to war, and the 
debate surrounding the merits of that war was sound.  But, the continued criticisms of the War 
Powers Resolution and its constitutionality only enhanced presidents‟ disdain for it and their 
desire to circumvent it.   
 While the George H.W. Bush Administration engaged in the first major, post-Vietnam 
military operation, the three reactions to Vietnam—the topic of this thesis—were just as 
prevalent as they were at their inception in the 1970s.  The Neoconservative Movement, the 
Abrams Doctrine, and the War Powers Resolution‟s collision course with one another came, as it 
turned out, when Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in August 1990.  As two of those ideas (the 
Abrams Doctrine and the War Powers Resolution) seemingly lost their effectiveness, 
Neoconservatism withstood the First Gulf War and made a resurgence in the early 2000s.  But 
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those three separate, sometimes conflicting ideas, which arose from the loss in Vietnam, 
interacted with one another most explicitly in the 1990s. 
GEORGE H.W. BUSH 
 When George Herbert Walker Bush was sworn in as the forty-first president of the 
United States in 1989, he had a lot to celebrate.  Reagan‟s Vice President‟s bid for the White 
House was tainted by the Iran-Contra Scandal and Reagan‟s near impeachment, but Bush won 
nonetheless.  For all the criticisms of Reagan‟s military adventurism around the world, and the 
legalities thereof, Bush won an impressive fifty-three percent of the popular vote and seventy-
nine percent of the electoral vote.
183
  In his inaugural address, Bush highlighted the need for 
fiscal responsibility, a stronger dialogue between the Executive and Legislative branches, the 
virtues of American democracy, and even condemned cocaine.
184
  Claiming, “The day of the 
dictator is over,” Bush extolled the virtues of American democracy and how people all over the 
world were thirsting for freedom.
185
  Though he did not mention it directly, Bush was clearly 
referencing the internal problems of the Soviet Union in the late 1980s and early 1990s.    
The Soviets were fighting a losing war in Afghanistan, the fall of the Berlin Wall and the 
reunification of Germany closed out 1989, Soviet satellites were revolting, and Mikhail 
Gorbachev was determined to finish his missions of glasnost (“openness”) and perestroika 
(“restructuring”).  By the time Bush had been sworn in, it was clear to many in the international 
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community that the Soviet Union‟s days were numbered, and that America would emerge as the 
lone superpower of the Cold War.  But, despite Bush‟s invocation of peace, freedom, and the day 
of the dictator being over, a new threat to America arose in the guise of a former ally: Saddam 
Hussein.  Saddam‟s invasion of Kuwait marked the defining moment of the H.W. Bush 
presidency and started what became fourteen years of United States involvement with Iraq.   
IRAQI-KUWAITI RELATIONS AND THE BUILD-UP TO THE FIRST GULF WAR 
 Following World War I, Great Britain dismantled the Ottoman Empire, a loser in the 
Great War.  Iraq, which had been under the control of the Ottoman Empire, was turned into a 
colony of Great Britain; however, in 1921, Britain made the decision to carve Kuwait out of the 
Iraqi borders.  The British had hoped to defeat the growing sense of Arab nationalism by 
restricting Iraq‟s access to the Persian Gulf and its Arab neighbors.  After Iraqi attempts to 
establish connections between Iraq and Kuwait failed (mainly as a result of British authorities 
vetoing any plans), the country of Kuwait became a symbol of humiliation for the Iraqi people.  
Shortly after the Second World War, the monarchy of Iraq was overthrown in a coup, and talks 
of returning Kuwait to Iraq were murmuring within the government.  Despite those notions, in 
1961, Britain declared Kuwait a free and sovereign nation.
186
    
The inability for Iraq to access the Persian Gulf, coupled with humiliation and Kuwait‟s 
oil fields, which could potentially add billions to Iraq‟s economy, led Iraqis to seek alternate 
routes to the Gulf, without entering Kuwait.  When Saddam Hussein became president of Iraq in 
1979, gaining access to the Gulf was a top priority, but Kuwait, supported by the U.S. and 
Britain, would not allow him access because of its own oil interests.  In 1980, the ambition of 
reaching the Gulf culminated in the Iran-Iraq War, which was also fueled by the longstanding 
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feud between the two nations.  The United States, which had declared Iran an enemy after the 
U.S.-backed Shah was overthrown in 1979, supported Saddam in the conflict (though Reagan 
was selling arms to the Iranians in the Iran-Contra plot).  The Iran-Iraq War lasted eight years 
and decimated the region.  Saddam did not conquer Iran or reach the Gulf as he had hoped, and 
so he turned his attention to the tiny nation that used to be a part of his: Kuwait.
187
 
Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990.  He had reiterated the claim that 
Kuwait had been a part of Iraq all along, so it was not an invasion, but a retaking of what was 
rightfully Iraq‟s.  Hussein later furthered his cause by saying that the Kuwaitis were stealing oil 
from Iraq, which he deemed economic warfare; therefore, the invasion was actually self-
defense.
188
  Whatever his reasons were, the United States could not let this type of aggression 
stand, especially in the Middle East where its oil interests were vital to the national economy.  In 
his address to the nation on August 8, 1990, President Bush remained steadfast in his support for 
Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and peace in the Middle East.  Bush laid out his demands for Saddam, 
told the American people that he had directed troops to be stationed in Saudi Arabia, and that the 
world‟s oil suppliers needed to increase production under the circumstances.189  This speech 
would also be the first time Bush leveled a comparison of Saddam to Hitler, stating that 
appeasement would not be a negotiating tactic.  But Bush did not emphasize two important 
points as much as he might have: 1) he had a clear objective and strategy for Iraq, two things that 
had not always been established in the previous three decades of American foreign policy and 2) 
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Saddam‟s invasion of Kuwait and subsequent acquisition of its oilfields did pose a significant 
threat to the western world and could potentially endanger the United States. 
 When Saddam‟s Iraqi Army trounced the Kuwaitis in early August, Saddam gained 
control of twenty percent of the world‟s oil supply.190  In a time in which the United States was 
not only using, but importing, more oil than ever before, one country controlling that much of the 
oil supply was a dangerous thing.  There were not only concerns for the oil already under 
Saddam‟s control, but some analysts thought that he might capture the Saudis‟ oil next, which 
would have given him fifty percent of the world‟s oil supply.191  In response to the invasion of 
Kuwait, President Bush was firm: “We will not let this aggression stand.”192  Having dispatched 
parts of the 82
nd
 Airborne Division to Saudi Arabia, at the request of the Saudis, Bush and his 
cabinet began weighing their options.
193
   
 The United Nations Security Council leveled economic sanctions against Iraq, but 
Saddam showed no signs of vacating Kuwait unless forcibly removed.
194
  Bush felt so strongly 
about the coalition he had built that he boasted, “Recent events have surely proven that there is 
no substitute for American leadership.”195  Saddam Hussein, on the other hand, was not 
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impressed by the West‟s tactics.  In an interview with CNN, Hussein said he was unmoved by 
the economic sanctions and made it clear that he had no intentions of leaving Kuwait.  Hussein 
was also adamant that he was trying to avoid a military confrontation, but Israel, British Prime 
Minister Margaret Thatcher, and President Bush seemed to favor that path.  Saddam then stated 
provocatively, “Whoever commits aggression against Iraq will be the party that shall turn out to 
be the loser.”196  It was obvious that Saddam, despite his confessed intentions of trying to avoid 
war, was provoking the West.  At the time, Iraq possessed the fourth-largest Army in the world 
and had proven to be quite efficient in its invasion of Kuwait; however, in a confrontation with 
the United States (which had been quite literally building-up and investing in its military for the 
last decade in preparation for something like this), Saddam was outmatched, whether he 
acknowledged it or not.  And, so President Bush, equipped with the world‟s greatest military 
machine, had to weigh the options and decide if forcibly removing Saddam from Kuwait was 
necessary.  What accompanied that decision, though, was that he had to seek Congressional 
approval—a task virtually ignored since Vietnam, and a move with which many 
Neoconservatives within his administration disagreed. 
BUSH VERSUS CONGRESS IN THE FIRST GULF WAR 
While weighing the options of a full-scale military operation in the Persian Gulf, 
President Bush often complained of his stomach hurting.  On several occasions, he would write 
in his diary that the pain in his lower gut was immense, and he would often need to take breaks 
throughout the day to lie down after taking a Mylanta.
197
  Bush‟s sickness was surely a physical 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
196. Eric Schmitt, “Mideast Tensions: Hussein, in U.S. T.V. Interview, Rejects Kuwait Withdrawal,” New 
York Times, October 30, 1990.  Hussein also stated in the interview that if economic sanctions were enough to make 
the U.S. leave Hawaii, then they would be enough for him to leave Kuwait.   
 
197. George H.W. Bush, All the Best, George Bush: My Life in Letters and Other Writings (New York: 
Simon and Schuster, Inc., 2013), 504.  
86 
  
manifestation of the pressures he felt as commander-in-chief on the eve of war.  But what was 
more striking was the degree to which Bush felt the Persian Gulf was a personal undertaking.  In 
his diary on January 13, 1991, Bush wrote, “It is my decision.  My decision to send these kids 
into battle, my decision that may affect the lives of innocence [sic].”198  Bush felt as though the 
military campaign against Saddam was his responsibility alone, not a decision for the country to 
make.  And while those sentiments are understandable, the system of government implemented 
in the U.S., and how it decided on matters of war, made the decision a shared responsibility, not 
just Bush‟s.  Bush wrote this entry in his diary the day before signing a war authorization against 
Saddam and two days before the U.N. deadline for Saddam to leave Kuwait.  Public Law 102-1 
gave Bush Congress‟s permission to aid the U.N. Resolution in using “all necessary means” to 
remove Saddam from Kuwait, but getting that permission did not come easily.   
AUGUST 1990 TO JANUARY 1991 
 At a press conference on August 30, 1990, President Bush had set the goals high for what 
a war in the Persian Gulf could mean.  “. . . I‟d like to think that out of this dreary performance 
by Saddam Hussein there could be now an opportunity for peace all through the Middle East,” he 
said, fielding questions from reporters.
199
  As the months went on and Saddam‟s occupation of 
Kuwait showed no signs of ending unless military action was taken, Bush, a World War II 
veteran, charged Saddam with being “worse than Hitler.”200  “I mean, people on a dialysis 
machine cut off, the machine sent to Baghdad; babies in incubators heaved out of the incubators 
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and the incubators sent to Baghdad,” Bush claimed, citing news reports of the atrocities 
committed by Saddam‟s army.201  Bush‟s rhetoric was persuading the American public to his 
view.  By the end of August, his approval ratings received a fourteen point boost.
202
   
 The increased favor did not last long.  A few months later, in October, the Bush 
Administration took quite a beating, both in Washington and in the public.  The budget 
showdown with Congress during the week of October 6
th
 caused Bush to write in his diary that “I 
think this week has been the most unpleasant, or tension filled of the Presidency.”203  Attempting 
to correct the budget deficits caused by the Reagan Administration‟s increased military spending, 
Congress forced Bush to renege on his promise of “no new taxes.”  The economic woes of the 
country, coupled with the public announcement of tax increases, decimated Bush‟s approval 
ratings.  The New York Times called his twenty-one point decline “one of the worst slides in 
public approval of any modern President.”204   
 October continued to be a trying month for the President.  As the situation in the Persian 
Gulf intensified, Congress adjourned for recess on October 28
th
 and was not scheduled to 
reconvene until January; this put the Bush Administration in a precarious situation.  Under the 
War Powers Resolution, it was required that Bush ask Congress for an authorization to use 
military force against Saddam; however, he could not ask if they were not in session.  Sensing 
that the situation in the Middle East may deteriorate in their recess, Congress appointed a special, 
eighteen-member committee to consult with the President on Middle East matters.  On the 
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morning of October 30
th
, the Congressional team met with the President and presented him with 
a letter signed by eighty-one constituents, calling it an “expression of concern.”  The text of the 
letter, however, unequivocally outlines its true intentions: 
Recent reports and briefings indicate that the United States has shifted from a 
defensive to an offensive posture and that war may be imminent.  We believe that 
the consequences would be catastrophic—resulting in the massive loss of lives, 
including 10,000 to 50,000 Americans.  This could only be described as war.  
Under the U.S. Constitution, only the Congress can declare war.
205
   
The Congressional leaders wanted to make certain that Bush, unlike his recent predecessors, 
could not keep them in the dark about his plans in the Persian Gulf.  Unlike Vietnam, Grenada, 
and the dealings in Latin America, Congress was asserting its authority before a military 
operation, not playing catch-up afterwards.  Bush rejected Congress‟s attempt to stifle 
presidential prerogative, as did many of the Neoconservatives serving by his side.  Arguing the 
troops he had dispatched to the Persian Gulf were in no imminent danger—which was a built-in 
loophole of the War Powers Resolution—Bush stated that he was well within his Constitutional 
right as Commander-in-Chief to shift forces.   
 Later that evening, Bush met with his advisors in the Situation Room of the White House 
to discuss strategies to expel Saddam.  The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell 
painted a stark picture for Bush: “Nearly double. About another 200,000 troops.”206  That, 
according to Powell and General Norman Schwarzkopf, Commander of U.S. forces in the 
Persian Gulf, was how many additional U.S. troops would be needed to forcibly remove Saddam 
from Kuwait, bringing the total number of troops in the region to 500,000.  It was certainly an 
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inflated number, but that was Powell‟s military philosophy.  The Powell Doctrine had four parts: 
an overwhelming, disproportionate force, clear objectives, an exit strategy, and public support.  
As a Vietnam veteran, Powell experienced what happened when an Administration neglects 
these prerequisites; Powell was determined to present President Bush with the harsh realities of 
war. 
 In addition to the increase in ground troops, Powell asked for an additional five or six 
aircraft carriers to be shifted into the Gulf to show that the United States was serious.  Powell 
later stated in an interview, “If this is important enough to go to war for, we‟re going to do it in a 
way that there will be no question what the outcome will be.”207  Bush, recalling that meeting, 
stated, “I did not want to repeat the problems of the Vietnam War, where political leadership 
meddled with military operations.”208  Powell also asserted that a military operation of this 
magnitude would depend on a call-up of the Reserves.  Just as General Creighton Abrams had 
sought to accomplish with his restructuring of the Army after Vietnam, Powell conceded that the 
Reservists were an integral component for this incursion.
209
 
 Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, who was also Powell‟s boss, was not in agreement 
with Powell‟s suggestions.  In his memoir, In My Time, Cheney wrote that “Listening to him 
made me think about how Vietnam had shaped the views of America‟s top generals.”210  It was 
clear that Cheney and Powell were clearly not on the same “team,” as Cheney sometimes put 
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it.
211
   In Cheney‟s estimation, Powell was purposefully inflating the numbers to try to dissuade 
Bush from action.  As adamant as Powell was that his estimates were not an effort to sway 
Bush‟s thinking, he did address the issue in his memoir.  While discussing his position on the 
political ramifications of his disproportionate troop call-ups and his reluctance for war, Powell 
wrote, “War is a deadly game; and I do not believe in spending the lives of Americans 
lightly.”212  Often highlighting the mistakes made in Vietnam, Powell later said that he was 
perhaps “the ghost of Vietnam,” for the Administration, serving as a reminder what could happen 
if there were not careful consideration.
213
   
Cheney was not the only cabinet member to accuse Powell of having ulterior motives.  
National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft, surprised by the force size Powell was requesting, 
believed, “The military . . . had moved from reluctance to undertake an offensive operation at all 
to a deliberately inflated plan designed to make the president think twice about the effort.”214  
Though he has since publicly maintained that his call for an endgame of 500,000 troops in the 
Persian Gulf was not politically motivated, Powell‟s plan certainly made President Bush 
reconsider military action.   
RESERVISTS 
 The number of troops Powell requested put the United States in a position it had not been 
in since Vietnam.  There had been plenty of military interventions undertaken by the United 
States since the 1970s—especially in Latin American countries—but 500,000 troops was an 
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unheard of figure in the post-Vietnam era.  More strikingly, Powell was not only asking for 
active duty troops; he was asking for Reservists, too.  It was the Abrams Doctrine‟s failsafe 
working.  The restructuring of the Army in the 1970s made the decision to call-up 500,000 more 
difficult because it would involve the call-up of Reservists.  As Powell told President Bush: “Sir, 
a call-up means pulling people out of their jobs.  It affects businesses.  It means disrupting 
thousands of families.  It‟s a major political decision.”215   
 After the October 30
th
 meeting and Powell‟s 500,000 troop request, the decision of when 
to activate the Reserves became the paramount concern for the Administration.  The 
congressional elections were held on November 6
th
, and many thought it was prudent to 
announce the mobilization afterwards.  On November 8
th
, 1990, President Bush made the 
announcement: “I have today directed the secretary of defense to increase the size of the U.S. 
forces committed to Desert Shield . . ..”216  It was not a declaration of war; only Congress could 
do that.  But it was an overt sign to Saddam that the United States was committed to his removal 
from Kuwait.   
The announcement also signaled to the American people that the United States was 
preparing for war and in a big way.  It was after Bush‟s announcement that debate over the 
merits of the war began.  As the New York Times argued, “After 14 weeks of proceeding 
virtually unchallenged at home, the United States policy in the Persian Gulf had become the 
focus of a national debate.”217 
 
                                                 
215. Powell, My American Journey, 456. 
 
216. George H.W. Bush, “The Public Papers of the President of the United States, George Bush, 1990” 
November 8, 1990, 1581. 
 
217. Michael Oreskes, “Mideast Tensions: A Debate Unfolds Over Going to War Against the Iraqis,” New 
York Times, November 12, 1990. 
 
92 
  
THE DEBATE RAGES 
         Bush‟s announcement of troop mobilization two days after the midterm elections had 
another pitfall in the war-making process, but a saving grace for the Administration.  Besides its 
signal that war was imminent, it also meant that Congress was not going to reconvene until 
January, over two months after the call-up.  What this effectively meant is that President Bush 
was solely in charge of the U.S. forces, waiting for Saddam to make a move in the Gulf.  In the 
interim, however, politicians (Republicans and Democrats alike) and the American people were 
weighing in on the possibility of war.  The debate quickly became intense, and several senators 
were calling for a special session of Congress to debate the merits of American involvement in 
Kuwait.  Senator Richard Lugar (R-IN), who served on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 
told the press that President Bush had “set the United States on a collision course in which Iraq 
will either withdraw from Kuwait or be forced to do so by military means.”218  Senator Ted 
Kennedy (D-MA) was more candid about Congressional responsibility: “Silence by Congress is 
an abdication of our constitutional responsibility and an acquiescence in war.”219  The Senator 
Majority Leader George Mitchell (D-ME) was unequivocal in his response to Bush‟s plans 
stating that the President “has no legal authority, none whatever” to take the country to war and 
that “the Constitution clearly invests that great responsibility in the Congress and the Congress 
alone.”220     
 As the debate raged on, it was clear, as Chairman of the House Armed Services 
Committee Congressman Les Aspin (D-WI) stated, there was a “lack of consensus in the country 
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about this policy.”221  In a meeting with Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, the House Armed 
Services Committee grilled the Secretary about Congressional involvement in the decision-
making process, to which Cheney reportedly replied, “How many of you really want to take a 
vote in advance on the use of force?”222  After no one on the committee raised his/her hand, they 
were satisfied with Bush‟s promise that there would be no war without first consulting them.   
It was not just the House Armed Services Committee that did not want to take a firm 
stance too early.  Senate Minority Leader Bob Dole (R-KS) was concerned that all of the public 
debate surrounding how best to remove Saddam was detrimental to the cause: “How do we have 
open debate without sending the wrong signal to Saddam?”223  Congressman Henry Hyde (R-IL) 
was more pacifying to the President with his stance: “Congress are supposed to be leaders.  We 
should be carrying the [President‟s] message to the people.”224   
 President Bush and his Neoconservative-filled Administration were steadfast in their 
position: the President did not need Congressional authority to shift troops into the Persian Gulf.  
They were in no imminent danger, so the sixty days cap set by the War Powers Resolution, 
which had become a main point of contention, did not apply.  And, Bush had announced the call-
up on national television, effectively informing Congress of U.S. troops being deployed, albeit at 
the same time the entire country was informed.  As National Security Advisor Scowcroft later 
recounted, “We were confident that the Constitution was on our side when it came to the 
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president‟s discretion to use force if necessary.  If we sought congressional involvement, it 
would not be authority we were after, but support.”225 
Republicans and Democrats had differing opinions on what should be done in the Middle 
East.  It was the level of debate the Founding Fathers had hoped for when they framed the 
Constitution to bestow the power of war with the Legislative Branch.  Continuing throughout 
November, the debate culminated in several members from the House of Representatives filing a 
lawsuit against President Bush to try to prevent the country from going to war without 
Congressional approval.   
DELLUMS VERSUS BUSH 
 Forty-five members of the House, led by Congressman Ron Dellums (D-CA), the same 
Congressman who testified that Grenada was not building a military airbase in 1983, filed a 
lawsuit against President Bush asking that an injunction be placed on any military operations 
against Saddam Hussein until Bush received Congressional approval.  As Dellums‟ fellow 
Californian Congressman Don Edwards (D-CA) argued, “There is no necessity for quick action 
here.  We are not being invaded.  There is no reason at all why the Constitution in this case 
should not be honored.  And that‟s what this lawsuit is about.”226  Dellums reiterated Edwards‟s 
point, “War is a very solemn and sobering and extraordinary act and it should not be granted to 
one person. . . . To do anything other than what we‟re suggesting here is to undermine the 
Constitution of the United States.”227   
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 There was reaction from within the Administration, especially from Dick Cheney, who, 
like most Neoconservatives, had been advocating for presidential prerogative for two decades.  
Future Secretary of Defense and notable Neoconservative Donald Rumsfeld, Cheney‟s mentor in 
the Ford White House, wrote in his 2011 memoir that in 1975, on the advice of an advisor, he 
had resolved not to “contribute to the erosion of presidential power on [his] watch,” later saying 
those words “left an impression on me, and, I suspect, on Cheney.”228  Cheney went on Meet the 
Press on November 18
th,
 1990 to defend the Administration‟s position and tactics.  Cheney told 
Garrick Utley, “I loved the Congress.  I had served there for ten years.  But I also had a sense of 
its limitations. . . . Putting a matter of the nation‟s security in the hands of the 535 members of 
the U.S. Congress was a risky proposition.”229  Like President Bush had done previously, Cheney 
then compared what was happening in the Persian Gulf to the Second World War:  
I take you back to September 1941 when World War II had been under way for 
two years.  Hitler had taken Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Norway, Denmark, 
the Netherlands, Belgium, France, and was halfway to Moscow.  And the 
Congress, in that setting, two months before Pearl Harbor, agreed to extend . . . 
the draft for twelve more months, by just one vote.
230
 
The comparison of Saddam‟s invasion of Kuwait and Hitler‟s blitzkrieg through Europe is a 
debatable one; however, Secretary Cheney was quite adamant about the dangers of letting 
Congress decide on whether or not the United States should confront Saddam militarily.  In a 
Congressional hearing prior to the war, Cheney was called to testify to make his case explicitly 
as to why President Bush did not need to seek Congressional approval.  In a heated exchange 
with Senator Ted Kennedy, Cheney took a firm stance on the issue stating, “Senator, I do not 
believe the president requires any additional authorization from the Congress before committing 
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US forces to achieve our objectives in the Gulf.”231  Cheney‟s views left the Congressional 
committee stunned.  Several times during the exchange, Senator Kennedy asked clarifying 
questions to make sure that there would be no doubts as to what Cheney was suggesting. Cheney 
later went on to argue that the United States had been engaged in military confrontations over 
200 times in its history, and war authorizations were only passed for five of those instances.
232
  
In short, Cheney argued that the President had historically led on foreign policy and should 
continue to do so.   
 Soon after the Congressional hearings, Federal District Judge Harold H. Greene ruled on 
Dellums v. Bush.  In his decision, Greene stated that he agreed with the petitioners that an 
invasion of Kuwait by several hundred thousand troops constituted a war.  He acknowledged that 
the Constitution of the United States was unequivocal in this matter, citing Article I, Section 8, 
Clause 11 as a guiding statute for war-making.  His judgment, however, stopped there.  Though 
the Congressional leaders were seeking an injunction against President Bush to effectively tie his 
hands from invading Kuwait, Greene did not issue the injunction.  He argued that the majority of 
Congress “is the only one competent to declare war, and therefore also the one with the ability to 
seek an order from the courts. . . . [U]nless the Congress as a whole, or by a majority, is heard 
from, the controversy here cannot be deemed ripe.”233  What Judge Greene argued was two-fold: 
first, Dellums‟s forty-five member caucus was not a majority of Congress, which would be 
required to obtain the injunction, and second, Congress needed to act as a majority in order to 
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start or stop the invasion of Kuwait.  What Judge Greene was effectively signaling to Congress 
was that it had the legal argument to stop the Bush Administration, but it needed to act together 
in order fulfill its Constitutional responsibility; the courts could not supplant Congressional 
authority. 
THE 102
ND
 UNITED STATES CONGRESS 
 Judge Greene‟s ruling in December 1990 clearly defined what the 102nd Congress‟s 
docket would look like when it convened in January 1991.  U.N. Resolution 678, passed on 
November 29, 1990, gave Saddam Hussein a deadline to leave Kuwait: January 15, 1991.  If 
Saddam had not vacated Kuwait by that time, the United Nations Security Council supported “all 
necessary means” to forcibly remove him.234  After the U.N. Resolution was passed, the 
Administration began to contemplate the need to seek similar authorization from Congress.  
National Security Advisor Scowcroft later wrote, “Once again we were faced with weighing the 
president‟s inherent power to use force against the political benefits of explicit support from 
Congress.”235  Not only did the Administration contemplate Congressional approval, but so did 
Congress.  Many agreed that since the U.N. had passed the resolution, it gave Congress what 
Congressman Henry Hyde (R-IL) called “desirable condition precedent” to debate the issue.236 
 Shortly before the Congress reconvened, President Bush still sought advice from his team 
on how the War Powers Resolution could be avoided if the 500,000 troops in the Gulf were sent 
into battle.  In a memorandum addressed to White House Counsel C. Boyden Gray, President 
Bush wrote, “Without recognizing the constitutional validity of the War Powers Resolution, is 
                                                 
234. United Nations. United Nations Security Council. 1990. Resolution 678. November 29, 1990.  
 
235. Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, 416. 
 
236. Zaldivar and Thompson, “Congress Unsure.” 
 
98 
  
there a way for the President to fulfill all his responsibilities to Congress . . . yet doesn‟t tie the 
President‟s hands?”237  Time was running out for Bush.  Some Congressional members, such as 
Senator Tom Harkin (D-IA), were calling for a war authorization to be the first piece of 
legislation on the agenda for the new Congress.  “The best time to debate this issue is before this 
country commits itself to war and not after.  Our constitutional obligations are here and now,” 
Harkin said on the first day of the new Congress.
238
     
 In early January, Congressional leaders met with President Bush to discuss a possible 
authorization.  In the meeting, Senate leaders George Mitchell (D-ME) and Bob Dole (R-KS) 
both agreed that they would not put the resolution on the floor until January 23
rd
.
239
  The 
announcement of that decision was celebrated by the Bush Administration, but condemned by 
members of Congress.  The outrage was understandable; Congressional leaders were proposing 
to discuss the possibility of a Congressional authorization eight days after the U.N. Resolution‟s 
deadline to Saddam.   
The American public was just as torn about going to war as Congress.  Only 53 percent 
of Americans supported the United States expelling Saddam from Kuwait, according to a Gallup 
poll.
240
   New York Times journalist and Pulitzer Prize-winner Anthony Lewis was more direct 
about what was at stake if Congress kept avoiding the debate: “Congress in recent decades has 
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avoided its responsibility.  We have come very far toward the monarchical Presidency that [the 
Founding Fathers] feared.”241   
AUTHORIZATION TO REMOVE SADDAM 
 In the end, Congress debated the merits of war a few days before the January 15
th
 
deadline to Saddam.  On January 8
th
, 1991, President Bush sent a letter to Speaker Tom Foley 
(D-WA) asking both the House and the Senate to pass a resolution supporting U.N. Resolution 
678.
242
  Arguing that this would send the clearest message to Saddam, Bush was not technically 
asking for a declaration of war.  Instead, he was asking for Congressional support for the U.N.‟s 
position.  Nevertheless, this was the closest thing to a consensus that would be achieved.  And, it 
did cause an open and public debate in Congress over the virtues of the intervention in the Gulf, 
just as the Founding Fathers intended.  The debates were equally zealous from parties on both 
sides of the issue.  When the votes were tallied, however, both the House and the Senate voted in 
support of the U.N. Resolution by votes of 250-183 and 52-47, respectively.  The United States 
was going to war.   
THE FINANICAL COSTS OF THE FIRST GULF WAR 
The Reagan era military budget had grown to an all-time peacetime high, while preparing 
for a fight that never came.  When the dissipation of the Soviet Union was only a matter of time, 
there were constituents asking for that money to be invested into other domestic programs.  In 
1990, there were numerous opinions on how to limit the Pentagon‟s share of the budget: Senator 
Ted Kennedy proposed a $210 billion cut in the defense budget over the next seven years; 
                                                 
241. Anthony Lewis, “Aboard at Home: Republic under Law,” New York Times, January 4, 1991. 
 
242. Bush, All the Best, 501-502. 
100 
  
Democrats proposed a five percent reduction in order to fund a tax cut for middle-class families; 
Republicans sought to use any extra money taken from the DoD to pay-down the deficit.
243
  
 Secretary of Defense Cheney, however, was not as willing to concede that there were cuts 
that could be made.  In a speech to Princeton University students, Cheney argued that anyone 
who thought that significant Pentagon budget cuts were prudent was irresponsible, stating that 
critics “never supported a strong national defense,” going on to say, “[they think] there is some 
kind of big peace dividend here to be cashed in and to buy all the goodies everybody on Capitol 
Hill can think about buying.”244  In the end, Cheney‟s objections were overridden.  Between 
1989 and 1991, the Department of Defense budget fell roughly eleven percent.
245
  Yet, there was 
a peace dividend.     
 “We could be so lavish with resources because the world had changed.  We could now 
afford to pull divisions out of Germany that had been there for the past forty years,” Powell 
wrote in his memoir.
246
  That was the peace dividend that so many mayors, senators, and 
congressmen were scrambling to collect. Now that the Soviet Union no longer threatened 
America‟s global objectives, the United States was able to move more freely in the world.  There 
were cuts to the Pentagon‟s budget—cuts the DoD more than regained in the following years—
but those cuts only were the monetary portion of the peace dividend.  The real peace dividend 
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was that the United States could unleash its military might without the same fears it had had in 
the previous four decades.  Without the threat of the Soviet Union, the United States could 
undertake huge missions, sparing no expense; the First Gulf War was the first example of this.  
 The United States‟ military dazzled in the First Gulf War.  The ground assaults were over 
in less than 100 hours, and it had routed Saddam out of Kuwait within five weeks.  It was the 
kind of military showing for which many within the Administration were hoping and one that 
Neoconservatives championed.  Some argued that the spending undertaken by President Reagan 
might have really been worth it.  If the United States could defeat Saddam‟s Iraqi Army (fourth 
largest in the world at the time) with such ferocity and ease, the military ends did justify the 
spending means.
247
  But there was one expense in the First Gulf War that did take many within 
the Pentagon by surprise: the Reservists.   
 In the First Gulf War, around 180,000 Reservists were called to active duty.  On the 
following page is a chart explaining each branch of military‟s contributions more fully248: 
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Figure 3-1: Reservists in First Gulf War 
 
 
Source: Figure 3-1, Source: Table 1: Use of Selected Reservists in Operation Desert Shield, Stephen Duncan, 
“War Confirms Total Force Policy” 
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 The Reservists contributed to Desert Storm in a big way, as General Colin Powell had 
intended them to do.  The Abrams Doctrine ensured that the major war effort undertaken by the 
United States would disrupt civilian life as much as possible.  Requiring the President to call-up 
180,000 Reservists from their everyday lives, from communities all over the country guaranteed 
that the war could not be a burden to a small portion of the American people, as had been the 
case with Vietnam. 
 One of the consequences of such a large call-up, however, was that the United States had 
to pay for all of these Reservists to now be full-time, active duty servicemen.  This meant that the 
government had to pay for health care, housing, salaries, day care for children, employer 
reimbursements, and a myriad of other expenses.  The United States defense budget had been 
downsized since the Reagan era, and Congress was threatening to make further cuts.  The 
Pentagon was faced with the decision of how to maintain American military superiority, but on a 
budget. 
PRIVATIZATION OF THE U.S. MILITARY 
 In 1996, the Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Outsourcing and 
Privatization stated that “Department of Defense support infrastructure has remained largely 
impervious to downsizing” and that the United States should “implement an aggressive 
outsourcing strategy.”249  The Task Force had a grim prediction for what would happen if the 
United States did not find some way to cut certain parts of the defense budget: “Without such an 
initiative, DoD may not be able to procure the new weapons systems and technological edge 
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needed to ensure the continuing military preeminence of the United States in the coming 
century.”250   
 The Task Force made the argument that many conservatives with disinclination to bigger 
government had been making for decades: the private sector was simply more efficient.  So 
confident was the Task Force in their predications that they said privatizing certain portions of 
the military could save the government seven to twelve billion dollars a year by 2002.
251
  What 
the Task Force emphasized in its report was that the United States‟ military could hire private 
contractors to do certain non-combat jobs and pay a fraction of what it paid to active-duty 
servicemen.  As Figure 3-1 illustrated on page 108, several of the Reservists functioned in key 
support roles—supply/service, medical, logistics—totaling tens of thousands of personnel.  What 
the Task Force theorized was that instead of having Reservists serve in those inherently non-
combat positions, the government could hire contractors, thus saving billions.  There were 
several consequences to this privatization, albeit, some unintended, that became evident in the 
mid-to-late 1990s and beyond.  This idea of privatization championed by the Task Force in 1996, 
however, had already gained traction in the Department of Defense in the early 1990s, under 
Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney.  But prior to this idea, Cheney was attempting to reduce the 
Pentagon‟s budget through bureaucratic restructuring, not privatization.     
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE DICK CHENEY, BUDGET CONSTRAINTS, AND 
REGIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY 
 
 After the fall of the Soviet Union, there was a general consensus in Washington that there 
would be military downsizing, just as the United States had done after every major war.  The 
defense budget did get trimmed in the first years of the Bush presidency, but these were strategic 
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cuts.  Dick Cheney, Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Paul Wolfowitz, and Colin Powell 
were determined to present programs that could be cut without severely affecting national 
security.  As Powell later wrote, “I wanted to offer something our allies could rally around and 
give our critics something to shoot at rather than having military reorganization schemes shoved 
down our throats.”252   
 The Defense Department‟s new, post-Cold War strategy for America‟s national security 
was presented to members of Congress on the same day that Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait.  
In the meeting where the new plans and drawdowns were supposed to be discussed, Powell 
wrote, “But all we heard was, yeah, sure, right.  But what‟s going on in Kuwait.”253  In the 
Defense Department‟s official report entitled, “Defense Strategy for the 1990s: The Regional 
Defense Strategy,” it was clear that the collapse of the Soviet Union did not affect the way the 
Bush Administration, or its Neoconservative allies, viewed the world.  As Cheney and the DoD 
saw it, “. . . [W]e can draw down out military force at a responsible rate that will not end up 
endangering our security,” something, he argued that had been done poorly in the past.254  The 
threat of the Soviet Union had ended, but there were other regimes in the world that sought that 
take its place that must be precluded.
255
   
 The first concept Cheney introduced was restructuring the military‟s “four pillars of 
capability” (readiness, sustainability, modernization, and force structure) into six pillars.  The 
traditional modernization pillar was broken into two pillars: science and technology and systems 
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acquisition, both having areas of overlap.  What was more important in Cheney‟s restructuring, 
however, was the development of a new “infrastructure and overhead” pillar.  Each of the 
existing pillars had overhead costs already built into their budgets, but now there was an entire 
section of the budget filled with overhead, a kind of rainy-day fund for the Pentagon.
256
  As 
Cheney argued, the restructuring was going to help “to reduce our cost of doing business and 
direct our shrinking resources to ensuring very high quality, ready forces and rigorous technical 
and doctrinal innovation.”257  What Secretary Cheney had done with his advent of the 
infrastructure and overhead pillar was give critics of the Pentagon‟s budget a target at which to 
aim.  Instead of cutting the funding to important, actual military-related programs, Congress 
could slash the overhead budget—without really affecting the budget or downsizing in a big 
way.  The idea, on Cheney‟s part, was politically genius.  Congress could get their budget cuts 
in, while the Pentagon could continue to spend on its desired materials; it was a win-win for all 
parties involved.  The restructuring of the military‟s budget was not the only revolutionary idea 
during Cheney‟s tenure.  The outsourcing and privatization celebrated in the 1996 Task Force 
report was also pioneered by H.W. Bush‟s Secretary of Defense. 
LOGCAP 
 LOGCAP, or the Logistics Civilian Augmentation Program, is one of the few 
government programs with a straightforward name; it quite literally means augmenting the 
number of military personnel with civilian contractors.  The first LOGCAP contract, known as 
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LOGCAP I, was signed in last few months of Cheney‟s tenure in 1992.258  In mid-1992, the 
Pentagon asked Brown and Root Services (now Kellogg, Brown and Root, or KBR) to study 
whether or not it was possible for civilian contractors to serve in some of the support functions of 
the military.  The Pentagon paid Brown and Root nine million dollars to conduct the study, and 
as the Washington Post later reported, “The Pentagon chose [KBR] to carry out the study and 
subsequently selected the company to implement its own plan.”259  The first LOGCAP contract 
was worth $811 million and oversaw contractors‟ involvement in Bosnia, Rwanda, Somalia, East 
Timor, and Haiti.
260
  Although it started with the H.W. Bush Administration, LOGCAP 
flourished under the next administration.   
LOGCAP UNDER CLINTON 
 The Clinton Administration relied heavily on civilian augmentation during its 
intervention in Bosnia.  In 1996, a report by National Performance Review stated, “Outsourcing 
and privatization of key support functions, with the strong prospect of lowering costs and 
improving performance, is under way under the leadership of the Deputy Secretary of 
Defense.”261  That initiative was evident in the Balkans.  Below are the results found by a special 
commission assembled to investigate the use of private contractors in recent U.S. military 
combat operations: 
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Figure 3-2: Percentage of Contractors in Total DoD Force in Recent Conflicts 
 
Source: Moshe Schwartz and Jennifer Church, “Figure 1, Department of Defense‟s Use of Contractor‟s to Support 
Military Operations: Background, Analysis, and Issues for Congress.” 
 
As the report concluded, the use of privatization has been fairly consistent in recent operations, 
accounting for half or more than half of the total forces.  In the Balkans, about fifty percent of 
personnel were contractors.  In the war in Afghanistan, the number of contractors increased to 
roughly fifty-five percent of the total force, and in Iraq, they accounted for a Balkans-like half.   
 The military‟s reliance on private contractors in the Balkans did not go unnoticed by the 
American press.  Bloomberg Business magazine wrote in 2003 that “. . . [I]t wasn‟t until U.S. led 
NATO forces into Bosnia in 1995 that the entire private military industry came of age.”262 As the 
article goes on to state, the Army was limited by President Clinton‟s decision to only call-up 
4,300 Reservists, so hiring contractors was the only logical option.  Political scientist P.W. 
Singer described the relationship between the U.S. military and Brown and Root Services as, “It 
is no exaggeration to say that where the U.S. military goes, so goes Brown and Root.”263  The 
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reliance on contractors, presented as a cost-saving measure, did have three significant, 
unintended consequences: misconduct of contractors, the financial costs of privatization not 
actually being cheaper, and the political implications of outsourcing military operations, leading 
to the ultimate demise of the Abrams Doctrine.  Though each of these affected the United States‟ 
foreign policy agenda respectively, the culmination of these three has called into question 
whether or not privatization of the military is the best way for the United States to execute its 
objectives abroad.   
MISCONDUCT OF CONTRACTORS 
 Ben Johnston worked as an airlift mechanic in Bosnia, as an employee of DynCorp (a 
major beneficiary of government military contracts).  After returning to the United States, 
Johnston became a whistleblower, speaking out against the conduct of government contractors in 
the Balkans.  A lawsuit was filed on his behalf against his former employer claiming, “Johnston 
learned that employees and supervisors from DynCorp were engaging in perverse, illegal and 
inhumane behavior [and] were purchasing illegal weapons, women, forged passports and 
participating in other immoral acts.”264 
 Johnston had several ethical concerns about DynCorp‟s contractors, but none were more 
disturbing than the alleged misconduct with children.  Johnston recounted a story of a middle-
aged man, weighing 400 pounds, who had purchased a “sex slave.”  The girl, as Johnston stated, 
could not have been more than fourteen years old.  The prostitution was no secret on the base 
where the DynCorp employees were stationed.  Johnston later claimed that the contractors were 
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in business with the Serbian mafia, who had been helping transport fresh girls into the base, and 
dispose of the girls when the contractors got tired of them.
265
   
 The prostitution, sex trafficking, and other illegal activities did not go unnoticed, but they 
did go unprosecuted.  According to the Office of the Staff Judge Advocate in Bosnia, “Under the 
Dayton Peace Accord, the contractors were protected from Bosnian law which did not apply to 
them,” and that they knew of “. . . [N]o [U.S.] federal laws that would apply to these individuals 
at this time.”266  The statute of the Dayton Peace Accord stating that U.S. citizens were not 
subjected to Bosnian law, which extended to the DynCorp contract, made it nearly impossible for 
the perpetrators to be held accountable for their crimes.  Bosnia could not prosecute them, and 
they had not broken any U.S. laws.  Unlike U.S. active-duty servicemen who would have been 
court martialed for this conduct, the DynCorp employees were able to avoid punishment for their 
alleged misconduct.   
 As seen in Figure 3-2, an equal number of U.S. military personnel and government 
contractors served in Bosnia.  Both the personnel and the contractors represented the United 
States in its efforts in the region.  The U.N. had declared the war in the Balkans a human rights 
violation.  Yet, despite the best intentions of the United States, the illegal acts of contractors only 
added to the human rights violations in the region, and the fact that no one could be prosecuted 
for their crimes only added to the disdain for the U.S. military in the region.  A U.N. peacekeeper 
in the region, Kathy Bolkovac, reiterated Johnston‟s claims of misconduct in the region, stating 
that peacekeepers—U.S. and U.N. alike—were trafficking young girls displaced by the war; she 
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was later fired for her claims.
267
  It was not only the sex trafficking facilitated by contractors that 
became evident in the Balkans, but the financial costs of privatization also became clear.   
IS PRIVATIZATION REALLY CHEAPER? 
 One of the main thrusts for privatizing certain portions of the U.S. military was that it 
would be a cheaper, more cost-effective approach.  Many conservatives argued that the private 
sector had always been better at innovating at a lower cost.  While reporting on the recent 
conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, reputable sources like the New York Times, the Washington 
Post, and even Congressional reports cited volumes of articles, lawsuits, and audits pertaining to 
private companies overcharging the Department of Defense.  Headlines like “U.S. Sees Evidence 
of Overcharging in Iraq Contract,” or “Halliburton Overcharged $108 Million, Report Says,” ran 
in the New York Times.
268
  The Washington Post published articles entitled, “Audit Finds That 
Iraq Contractor Overcharged for Repair Parts,” and “Army Contracting Criticized.”269  And, Ben 
Johnston, who had been deeply disturbed by the sexual forays of DynCorp‟s employees, was just 
as disturbed by the way the contractors worked. 
 “There was this one guy who would hide parts. . . . They‟d have us replace windows in 
helicopters that weren‟t bad just to get paid,” Johnston told the reporter.  Moreover, Johnston 
claimed that DynCorp would hire teenagers, fresh out of high school, who knew nothing about 
basic mechanics in order to ensure the process would take longer, costing the government more.  
The same 400 pound man who was accused of having sex with the fourteen year old girl, 
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Johnston said would often fall asleep; one time “with a blowtorch in his hand and burned a hole 
through the plastic on the aircraft.”270   
 Despite the growing concerns of fraudulent charges to the government, privatization of 
military tasks still continued to increase.  Figure 3-2 demonstrates that the number of contractors 
in Iraq and Afghanistan constituted more than half of the total U.S. force.  And the renewal of 
LOGCAP contracts in the past decade increased, both in service providers and in dollar value.  
LOGCAP II, valued at $102 million and lasting from 1997 to 2001, was awarded solely to 
DynCorp, even after the allegations of misconduct and overcharging in the Balkans.  When the 
Global War on Terror began in 2001, Kellogg, Brown, and Root Services was awarded 
LOGCAP III, valued at $35.7 billion.  LOGCAP IV, signed in 2007 and in effect until 2017, was 
awarded to KBR, DynCorp, and Fluor International at a value of $2.4 billion.
271
  The billions of 
dollars spent on private contractors steadily increased—peaking with LOGCAP III—since the 
introduction of privatization of the military in the early 1990s, with 2002 being the first year in 
which more than half of the Pentagon‟s budget was earmarked for contracts.  Below is a graph 
representing this shift: 
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Figure 3-3: Total Contract Spending by Department of Defense in Constant 2010 Dollars 
     
Source: Center for Strategic and International Studies, Figure 2.1 “U.S. Department of Defense Contract Spending 
and the Supporting Industrial Base,” 2010. 
 
 The bottom portion of each bar graph represents the total dollar amount the DoD spent on 
contractors.  Since 1990, which saw $158 billion spent on contractors, the amount has more than 
doubled and has accounted for more than half of the overall DoD budget ($368 billion in 2010).  
It is impossible to determine how much money has been saved by using these defense contracts, 
because that would be trying to analyze something that did not happen; however, there have been 
reports that the privatization of the military has cost the taxpayers billions of dollars without 
returns.   
 In the Senate Appropriations Committee‟s report on “Examining the Effectiveness of 
U.S. Efforts to Combat Waste, Fraud, Abuse, and Corruption in Iraq,” it was determined that the 
government awarded DynCorp a $1.4 billion contract and had paid $1.2 billion of it.  In the 
report, it was reported that the government agencies “did not know specifically” what had been 
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received for the billion-dollar investment.
272
  The Washington Post reported that a special 
congressional auditor had found that DynCorp had overbilled the U.S. government $50 million 
more than they had proposed in their contract.
273
  Countless stories have been written discussing 
the financial misconduct of companies dealing with the Department of Defense.  What is most 
telling, however, was what the Defense Department itself determined in 2012. 
 Former Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta presented a plan in 2012 that would cut costs 
in the Pentagon‟s budget over the next ten years, saving $450 billion (even a trillion dollars, if 
the cuts increased).
274
  Included in his presentation was the chart below showing defense 
expenditures: 
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Figure 3-4: Pentagon‟s Personnel Composition Chart, 2012 
    
Source: Dana Liebelson, “NYT Misses Elephant in the Room: Defense Service Contractors,” Project on 
Government Oversight 
 
The Department of Defense determined, as seen by the text in the top portion, that the cost of 
defense contractors is where the Pentagon could save the most money: “The savings are here.”  
The chart also says, “Its growth has been unchallenged and often we don‟t even know what is in 
the base.”  When realizing that over half of the Pentagon‟s budget (52% in 2010) cannot be fully 
accounted for, the logic of the cost-effectiveness of military privatization is questionable; 
however, the Pentagon‟s recognition that this section of the budget is becoming “increasingly 
unaffordable” lends credence to the argument that the privatization is not as fiscally sound as it 
had once been proposed to be.   Despite the disturbing accusations of sexual misconduct by 
contractors and the doubts of its financial soundness, privatization of the military presented its 
most profound consequence: its ability to make the decision to go to war easier, and its inherent 
ability to circumvent the Abrams Doctrine.   
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THE POLITICAL RAMIFICATIONS OF PRIVATIZATION 
 Under the Abrams Doctrine, which had been employed during the First Gulf War, it was 
impossible for the United States to go to war without a call-up of the Reserves, affecting the lives 
of countless families all over the country, as seen by the 180,000 Reservists serving in that war 
and General Powell‟s assertion that it was a “major political decision.”  It was reasoned that the 
Reservists were needed to serve in support functions of the military; they were the ones building 
barracks, driving supplies, and cooking meals.  Yet, when the U.S. government decided to 
outsource those tasks to private companies, in order to save money, the need for activating the 
Reserves disappeared.  Now, the number of families affected would decrease, communities 
would not be as disrupted, people would not be missing from their jobs.  Those staple, in-your-
town, influential community members would not have to be called to active duty; their support 
functions were now undertaken by companies.  The privatization of the military effectively 
brought with it the antidote to the Abrams Doctrine.   
Take, for example, the number of contractors serving in Iraq and Afghanistan, outlined 
on the following page:  
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Figure 3-5: Number of Contractors Serving in Iraq and Afghanistan, September 2007 to March 
2013 
 
 
 
Source: Table 1-A, “Contactor Personnel and Troop Level in Afghanistan” Congressional Research Service 
Before the privatization of the military, the number of contractors serving would have been 
negligible.  Under the Abrams Doctrine, those hundreds of thousands of contractors would have 
instead been Reservists.  The number of lives disrupted by the war would have been in the 
millions; that was the point.  Privatization of the military brought with it less noticeable warfare.  
The entire country no longer had to mobilize for war, because private companies shouldered 
most of the burden, while hiring nationals to augment their numbers.  For example, in March 
2013, of the 107,796 contractors serving in Iraq and Afghanistan, 74,689 were citizens of 
countries other than the United States.  What that figure translates into is that nearly 75,000 
Americans (active duty troops, Reservists, or American citizens in general) were not needed for 
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those excursions, thus minimizing the effects of war among the general population.  As Major 
General Camille Nichols argues, “Deploying LOGCAP or other contractors instead of military 
personnel can alleviate the political and social pressures that have come to be a fact of life in the 
U.S. whenever military forces are deployed.”275  What had started as the idea of Dick Cheney 
and his colleagues at the Defense Department now accounted for a majority of the defense 
budget twenty years later.  
 While the First Gulf War and privatization of the military had seemingly negated the 
Abrams Doctrine, the third reaction explored throughout this thesis continued to greatly 
influence America‟s foreign policy agenda: Neoconservatism.  The calls to assert America‟s 
military might abroad sharply defined Cheney‟s Regional Defense Strategy of the „90s.  In the 
H.W. Bush Administration, the Defense Department was filled with Neoconservatives, who 
continued to be influential figures in American foreign policy long after the early 1990s.  By the 
end of the George H.W. Bush‟s presidency, Neoconservatives‟ assertion that the U.S. must 
spread its democracy abroad became the guiding tenet of American foreign policy for the next 
two decades. 
NEOCONSERVATIVES AND THEIR INFLUENCE IN THE GEORGE H.W. BUSH 
AND BILL CLINTON ADMINISTRATIONS 
 
 As discussed in the first two chapters, the Neoconservative Movement‟s formative years 
were in the late 1960s and 1970s.  During the Reagan Administration, Neoconservatives began to 
have an active, tangible role in government, specifically in tailoring foreign policy ideas, with 
respect to Grenada, Iran-Contra, and presidential prerogative.  As Reagan‟s Vice President, 
George H.W. Bush filled his administration with several familiar faces, after becoming 
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President.  Dick Cheney, a Congressman from Wyoming during the Reagan Administration, was 
a staunch supporter of presidential prerogative, emphasized in his Minority Report to the Iran-
Contra hearings.  As H.W. Bush‟s Secretary of Defense, Cheney only furthered his views of 
presidential prerogative, specifically in support of Bush‟s plans for the Persian Gulf.  The 
Regional Defense Strategy pioneered by Cheney‟s Defense Department reads very much like a 
Neoconservative foreign policy agenda.  Arguing for the benefits of U.S. leadership abroad, the 
guide states, “. . . [the strategy will] enable the U.S. to lead in shaping an uncertain future so as to 
preserve and enhance this strategic depth won at such great pains.”276   
 It was not just Cheney who advocated for this type of American leadership in the coming 
decades.  The Regional Defense Strategy is often called the “Wolfowitz Doctrine,” named for 
Cheney‟s Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Paul Wolfowitz.  Paul Wolfowitz made a name 
for himself in the Reagan Administration serving in ambassadorships and in a position with the 
State Department.  What became evident in the first Bush Administration was that Wolfowitz 
and Cheney were “on the same team.”   
 Surprisingly, however, many Neoconservative think-tanks did not support the Bush 
Administration‟s foreign policy agenda.  Arguably, the Neoconservative Movement lost much of 
its gusto at the end of the Cold War.  The Soviet Union was extinct, meaning America‟s number 
one enemy was defeated.  Many of the tenets of Neoconservative foreign policy, as seen in 
Chapter One, only have merit if American democracy is juxtaposed against a threat; this meant 
that because the Soviet Union was no longer a risk, the movement‟s central foreign policy focus 
became irrelevant.   
 The dissolution of the U.S.S.R., coupled with the emphasis of scaling-back the post-Cold 
War defense budget, gave the impression that the United States‟ priority was shifting to the 
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domestic agenda.  As highlighted in this chapter, there were many politicians urging for the so-
called “peace dividend” to be spent on domestic programs—i.e., education, infrastructure, 
healthcare.  This shift in priorities negated the main crux of the Neoconservative argument.  As 
the Neoconservatives were seemingly losing their political capital in Washington because of the 
Cold War‟s end, Saddam‟s invasion of Kuwait became their opportunity to reestablish their 
preeminence on foreign policy.   
NEOCONSERVATIVES AND THE FIRST GULF WAR 
 With his invasion of Kuwait, Saddam Hussein became America‟s major enemy in the 
post-Cold War era.  It was also the first opportunity for Neoconservatives to demonstrate how 
their foreign policy ideas could be implemented after the fall of the Soviet Union.  The removal 
of Saddam from Kuwait was a hotly contested issue in America, but once the decision was made 
to expel Saddam from Kuwait, but not remove him from power, the Neoconservative Movement 
attacked the Bush Administration‟s approach. 
 For Neoconservatives, the decision of the Bush Administration not to remove Saddam 
from power was a mistake.  One of the more common suggestions of Neoconservatives was to 
empower the Iraqi people to rise up against Saddam, which Bush later did.  In a speech to the 
American Academy for the Advancement of Science, President Bush urged the Iraqi people to 
depose Saddam before an invasion: “. . . [T]he Iraqi military and the Iraqi people [must] take 
matters into their own hands, to force Saddam Hussein, the dictator, to step aside.”277  Renowned 
Neoconservative commentator Norman Podhoretz, however, criticized Bush‟s lack of 
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exploitation of the Iraqi people‟s sentiments, stating that Bush had called for the Iraqi people to 
mobilize against Saddam, but did nothing to effect that change.
278
   
 The decision not to remove Saddam from power created a schism within the 
Neoconservative Movement.  The coalition‟s overwhelming victory, led by the United States, 
further cemented the Neoconservatives‟ belief that American leadership was the best in the 
world.  Despite the victory, many Neoconservatives were unhappy with the lack of finality in the 
mission.  In a speech in 1992, Dick Cheney, who became an outspoken advocate for Saddam‟s 
removal in 2003, stood by the Administration‟s decision to not overthrow the despot.  “. . . I 
think we got it right, both when we decided to expel him from Kuwait, but also when the 
president made the decision not . . . to take over and govern Iraq,” Cheney claimed.279  
Wolfowitz reiterated Cheney‟s assessment: “A new regime would have become a [U.S.] 
responsibility.  Conceivably, this could have led the U.S. into a more or less permanent 
occupation of a country that could not govern itself, but where the rule of a foreign occupier 
would be increasingly resented.”280   
 What is ironic about Cheney and Wolfowitz not supporting a regime change in Iraq 
during the First Gulf War is two-fold: one, they had created the Regional Defense Strategy, 
which has decidedly called for instances such as this, and two, they both strongly advocated 
Iraq‟s regime change in the early 2000s.  But these two men represent a larger constituency.  
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Neoconservatives‟ writings further illustrate the differing viewpoints on American foreign policy 
in the 1990s.   
NEOCONSERVATIVE WRITINGS OF THE 1990S 
 The American Enterprise Institute database reveals strikingly similar results about the 
First Gulf War as it did in the Reagan Administration in Chapter Two.  The number of writings 
done by Neoconservatives during the First Gulf War pertaining to Saddam Hussein is merely 
three and the “Gulf War” returns four results, only two of which have any meaningful relevance 
to the First Gulf War.
281
  The number of writings on both subjects, as was the case with Reagan, 
exponentially increased after the actual events were over.
282
  What the numbers highlight is a 
great contradiction in the Neoconservative ideology.  Undoubtedly full of ideas, 
Neoconservatives often wait until a controversial event or policy is over to defend or condemn 
its merits, as seen by this inquiry and by the Reagan era search.   
 After Bush lost the election to Bill Clinton in 1992, Neoconservatives faced another 
obstacle.  They had struggled to find their movement‟s niche after the fall of the Soviet Union, 
and now they were out of power for the first time in over a decade.  The First Gulf War was a 
public relations godsend, the idea of military privatization found refuge in the Clinton 
Administration, and America‟s military continued to be the standard all over the world.  By 
1992, the Neoconservative ideology had left its indelible mark on American foreign policy and 
politics.  There was a concern among Neoconservatives, however, as to what would happen once 
they no longer dictated America‟s foreign policy agenda.   
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NEOCONSERVATIVES AND BILL CLINTON 
 When Bill Clinton became President, many Neoconservatives left political office.  
Clinton, in his First Inaugural Address, did not shirk America‟s responsibilities abroad, but he 
did make it clear that his administration‟s focus was on domestic affairs.  “Raised in unrivaled 
prosperity, we inherit an economy that is still the world's strongest but is weakened by business 
failures, stagnant wages, increasing inequality, and deep divisions among our own people,” 
Clinton stated, highlighting the challenges the country faced.
283
  Clinton‟s speech was 
remarkable in that it was the first time in fifty years that a President did not have to address the 
threat of Communism during his inaugural address.
284
 As the focus of the Clinton Administration 
shifted to the domestic, the Neoconservative influence dissipated.  Dick Cheney left office and 
became CEO of Halliburton.  Paul Wolfowitz worked at Johns Hopkins University during the 
Clinton presidency. The authors of the Neoconservative-styled Regional Defense Strategy were 
no longer controlling America‟s defenses.  Although Neoconservatives were out of power, it did 
not mean that their ideas were not being used.   
Clinton relied heavily on Cheney‟s privatization of the military. Pulitzer Prize-winning 
Professor of Sociology Paul Starr notes that privatization is employed by Neoconservatives as a 
political strategy to shift the burden from the government; therefore, Clinton‟s use of 
privatization meant that elements of Neoconservatism were still influential, even when 
Neoconservatives held no prominent roles.
285
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The Neoconservatives did not let their intermission from office mark the end of their 
opinions on the issues.  It is no coincidence that many prominent Neoconservative groups were 
formed during the period between Bush Administrations.  The Project for the New American 
Century (PNAC) is possibly the most well-known, Neoconservative organization formed at this 
time.  Many PNAC founders, like Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, Douglas Feith, and Paul 
Wolfowitz, later served the George W. Bush Administration in prominent foreign policy 
positions, often advocating the same principles listed in the PNAC founding documents. 
PROJECT FOR THE NEW AMERICAN CENTURY AND ITS FOUNDERS 
Founded in 1997, PNAC sought to “promote American global leadership.”286  In the 
organization‟s Statement of Principles, which was signed on June 3, 1997, PNAC‟s founders 
explicitly attacked the foreign policy agenda of President Clinton, calling his policies 
“incoherent.”  Republicans and Democrats were both subject to criticisms in the document, 
because both parties, in the founders‟ views, had in one way or another allowed America‟s 
superiority to fall.  The Clinton era cuts to the defense budget, PNAC claimed, had hindered 
America‟s ability to lead and halted American advances in global leadership.  It was not only 
their present that Neoconservatives were concerned about: America‟s future preeminence was 
also at stake.   
“. . . [W]e are jeopardizing the nation's ability to meet present threats and to deal with 
potentially greater challenges that lie ahead,” PNAC‟s founding principles argued.287  As seen in 
Chapter One, the Neoconservative Movement gained a reputation for seeking out real and 
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perceived threats abroad.  It was clear that this notion was shared by PNAC‟s founders.  It was 
also evident that PNAC supported the Reagan Administration‟s Cold War strategy, advocating: 
We seem to have forgotten the essential elements of the Reagan Administration's 
success: a military that is strong and ready to meet both present and future 
challenges; a foreign policy that boldly and purposefully promotes American 
principles abroad; and national leadership that accepts the United States' global 
responsibilities.
288
 
 
The ideas of the Reagan Administration and their influence on the end of the Cold War can be 
debated.  What is important, however, is that PNAC not only thought that the Reagan 
Administration‟s foreign policy agenda was successful, but that it should be emulated.        
 This admiration for the Reagan Doctrine brings with it several challenges.  First, the 
world‟s political climate had changed dramatically since the Reagan Administration.  The Soviet 
Union no longer deterred American foreign policy, and there was no new rival that presented a 
comparable threat.  Many of the tenets of Reagan‟s foreign policy were rendered irrelevant after 
the Soviet Union‟s collapse: no longer could deficits caused by military spending be justified by 
a Soviet threat, and America no longer had to worry about its “sphere of influence” because it 
was the lone superpower.  Secondly, the end of the Cold War had shifted America‟s focus to the 
domestic, as seen by the calls for reforms in the early „90s and the cuts in the Pentagon‟s budget 
to fund those reforms.  Those key, drastic changes in the world did not deter PNAC from 
advocating the merits of having a global military presence.   
 In the conclusion of its Founding Principles, PNAC offered its four, clear objectives for 
American foreign policy: we need to increase defense spending significantly; we need to 
strengthen our ties our democratic allies and to challenge regimes hostile to our interests and 
values; we need to promote the cause of political and economic freedom abroad; and we need to 
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accept responsibility for America‟s [role as a superpower].289  Acknowledging that these 
principles had fallen out of fashion in the post-Cold War era, PNAC maintained that they were 
the only way to ensure America‟s prosperity in the future.  Additionally, PNAC published its 
seminal foreign policy guide, “Rebuilding America‟s Defenses,” arguing that cuts in defense 
spending would be detrimental and that American troops should be stationed abroad.
290
   
 PNAC became most famous during the Clinton Administration for its letter to the 
President regarding Saddam Hussein.  Sent on January 28
th
, 1998, the letter urged President 
Clinton to change his unsuccessful policy towards Iraq.  “[Your] strategy should aim, above all, 
at the removal of Saddam Hussein‟s regime from power,” the letter stated, though many of its 
signatories defended their decision not to remove Saddam from power just eight years earlier.
291
  
Arguing that the U.N. inspectors in Iraq and the coalition formed in the First Gulf War were no 
longer effective in deterring Saddam from acquiring weapons of mass destruction, PNAC 
advocated a much more aggressive policy towards Iraq, offering its full support to Clinton 
should he heed their warning.  Of the eighteen people who signed the letter, eleven later served 
in the George W. Bush Administration, and its subsequent removal of Saddam Hussein from 
power in 2003: Eliot Abrams (Deputy National Security Advisor for Global Democracy); Paula 
Dobriansky (Under Secretary of State for Democracy and Global Affairs); Zalmay Khalilzad 
(U.S. Ambassador to U.N., Iraq, and Afghanistan); Peter Rodman (Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for International Security Affairs); Donald Rumsfeld (Secretary of Defense); Paul 
Wolfowitz (Undersecretary of Defense); Richard Armitage (US Deputy Secretary of State); 
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Jeffrey Bergner (Assistant Secretary of States for Legislative Affairs); John Bolton (US 
Ambassador to the United Nations); William Schneider, Jr. (Chairman of the Defense Science 
Board); Robert Zoellick (US Deputy Secretary of State).  These appointments represented the 
culmination of the Neoconservative Movement‟s influence, an influence that had been building 
since the Vietnam War.   
CONCLUSION 
 The George H.W. Bush presidency was, for all intents and purposes, the amalgamation of 
the three reactions to the Vietnam War outlined at the onset of this thesis.  The First Gulf War, 
which was the country‟s first post-Vietnam, major military operation, brought with it several 
challenges to the Abrams Doctrine and the War Powers Resolution.  The Administration wanted 
to limit the number of Reservists serving in the Gulf, and sought to take the country to war 
without the implementing the Abrams Doctrine—a strategy eventually overruled following 
General Colin Powell‟s stark request for 500,000 troops, Reserves included.  It was not until the 
privatization of the military, a concept first pioneered by Neoconservatives in the Defense 
Department in the 1990s, that the Abrams Doctrine‟s objectives were negated by augmenting a 
fighting force with civilian contractors, thus limiting the number of troops needed for war.   
 The War Powers Resolution saw its constitutionality challenged repeatedly since its 
inception, but the ferocity with which it was defended in the months prior to the First Gulf War 
was admirable.  Congressional leaders sought to reestablish themselves as the war-making 
branch of government, and eventually debated the merits of going to war in the Middle East.  
Although an authorization for war was not technically passed, the system designed by the 
Founding Fathers had worked: many opinions, arguments, and people were heard and, through 
the votes of elected officials, the country decided to go to war.  The War Powers Resolution, 
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despite its inherent flaws and written-in loopholes, was adhered to for the First Gulf War, much 
to the chagrin of the Bush Administration.  Later administrations continuously inhibited the 
Resolution‟s potency, but it had effectively served its purpose for the Persian Gulf crisis.   
 Unlike its Vietnam-era counterparts, the Neoconservative Movement came out of the 
H.W. Bush Administration stronger.  Although removed from power with the election of 
President Clinton, Neoconservative ideas were still frequently used; most notably, the 
privatization of the military, seen by the increased use of contractors in the Balkans.  The 
Neoconservative influence continued to shape America‟s foreign policy agenda arguably more 
so than any other political ideology during this time.  And their repeated, persistent calls for 
American military superiority were accepted by the George W. Bush Administration and its 
subsequent War on Terror.  While the Abrams Doctrine and the War Powers Resolution faded 
from the foreign policy sphere, the ideology that had formed in response to the loss in Vietnam 
had fully recognized its goals by the end of the twentieth century.   
    In the George H.W. Bush Administration, Neoconservatism, the Abrams Doctrine, and 
the War Powers Resolution had fully interacted with one another during the First Gulf War.  
While their inception was a result of the Vietnam War, their true test came nearly twenty years 
later.  After being thoroughly tested in the early 1990s, only one emerged stronger than ever: 
Neoconservatism.  The War Powers Resolution continued to be contested, and the Abrams 
Doctrine was no longer applicable because of military privatization.  The two ideas arising in the 
post-Vietnam era to prevent the country from going to war had been defeated, while the ideology 
supporting military interventions abroad flourished.  And it is this failure of two and success of 
one that has guided U.S. foreign policy most significantly in the last fifty years.   
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CONCLUSION 
 In the post-Vietnam era, the politics of war in America have changed significantly.  It 
was out of that war‟s failure that three reactions emerged to directly shape America‟s foreign 
policy for the next five decades: Neoconservatism, the Abrams Doctrine, and the War Powers 
Resolution.  The culmination of these three ideas and policies in the George H.W. Bush 
Administration was not an anomaly; the United States‟ political landscape had shifted in such a 
way that their interaction with one another was inevitable.  Their collision course was set into 
motion when Congress passed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution in 1964.   
 As seen in Chapter One, Lyndon Johnson‟s authorization to use military force in Vietnam 
cultivated several domestic reactions: many Americans were outraged by the war‟s seemingly 
endless nature; casualties of United States soldiers and Vietnamese citizens became the impetus 
for the antiwar movement in the late 1960s; and the war began to fracture America‟s political 
parties, as some argued for the war‟s end, while others maintained that the United States should 
stay the course.  As the war‟s failure became apparent, the arrival of a new political philosophy, 
Neoconservatism, gave the arguments surrounding America‟s military adventurism a new 
sheen.
292
   
 While the war was becoming increasingly unpopular domestically, Neoconservatives‟ 
arguments that the United States should continue its excursions in Vietnam catapulted them into 
the national spotlight.  Though their ideas and arguments were not enough to prolong the 
conflict, they had carved out a political niche that would later find a home in the Reagan 
Administration, as explained in the latter part of Chapter Two.  Arguing that the United States 
should and must promote its democracy throughout the world—often facilitated by military 
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might—Neoconservatives maintained a position that had fallen out of mainstream politics in the 
early-mid 1970s, but was reinvigorated by the anti-Communist fervor of the Reagan era.
293
  With 
its promotion of American superiority, the Neoconservative Movement eventually gained 
massive success, shaping foreign policies since the 1980s.  What made Neoconservatism unique, 
however, is that it argued for the exact opposite approach taken by its Vietnam-era counterparts.   
 Highlighted in Chapter One, the Abrams Doctrine, named for U.S. Army Chief of Staff 
General Creighton Abrams, who had served as commander of U.S. forces in Vietnam from 1968-
1972, sought to prevent another military excursion like the war in Southeast Asia.  Arguing that 
President Johnson‟s decision not to call-up the Reserves for the war in Vietnam removed the 
conflict from the American consciousness too much, Abrams made Reservists an integral part of 
the military.
294
  Making certain that Reservists served in key support functions, like cooking 
meals, building barracks, and driving trucks, Abrams forced presidents to activate the Reserves if 
they wanted to go to war.
295
  Though the economic arguments surrounding the Abrams Doctrine 
are coherent, it is the Abrams Doctrine‟s political implications that are most significant.   
 Reservists, when not serving on active duty, are often integral parts of their communities.  
As was the case with President Johnson, he realized that activating the Reserves would make the 
war more noticeable, because it meant disrupting the lives out countless individuals.  Johnson‟s 
decision to augment the fighting force with draftees, who came from less affluent parents and 
lower socio-economic backgrounds, meant that he avoided a call-up.  A plan born out of political 
necessity had detrimental consequences for the military: soldiers lost morale, feeling as if they 
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were the only ones at war when the entire country was at war.  It was in reaction to that feeling 
that General Abrams developed his restructuring, determined to never let another president 
ravage the military without causing as much disruption to the civilian population as possible.  In 
effect, the Abrams Doctrine was hindering a president‟s ability to wage war.  Abrams was not 
alone in his pursuit; Congress sought to accomplish the same thing.   
 When the War Powers Resolution Act was passed in 1973, it sent a direct message to not 
just President Nixon, but to all future presidents: if there is going to be a war, there must be 
congressional approval.  Citing Article I, Section 8, Clause 11 of the U.S. Constitution, Congress 
reasserted itself as the only branch vested with the ability to declare war.
296
  Realizing their 
mistakes with the passage of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, Congress made it clear that 
presidents were no longer permitted to wage war on their own accord.  Challenged by presidents 
on the basis of its constitutionality, the War Powers Resolution saw its greatest challenges in the 
Reagan era and its excursions examined in Chapter Two.  Neoconservatives, who had filled 
Reagan‟s Administration, argued that the president had certain inherent powers, and that he 
could embark on military operations without Congressional approval.  It was the disdain for this 
law that became apparent during the invasion of Grenada, interventions in Latin America, and 
the Reagan Administration‟s involvement in the Iran-Contra Scandal.  While Reagan‟s 
successor, George H.W. Bush, adhered to the War Powers Resolution, subsequent presidents 
have continuously argued against its merits, leading to a slow degradation of its potency.      
 All three of these reactions to Vietnam remain as important today as they were at their 
inception.  The Neoconservative Movement has helped shape the foreign policy agenda of every 
administration since Reagan, often by arguing against its Vietnam counterparts.  
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Neoconservative ideas, which started to gain prominence in the 1980s, arguably reached their 
apex of influence during the George H.W. Bush Administration and have continued to be 
influential until today, which formed the basis for the final chapter of the thesis.  The Abrams 
Doctrine, which was designed to make the decision to go to war more challenging, has largely 
been negated.  With the military privatization idea pioneered by Dick Cheney in the 1990s, 
presidents no longer are forced to call-up the Reserves in great numbers because they can hire 
contractors to fill those inherently non-combat roles that Reservists were required to do.  The 
War Powers Resolution, though still in effect, has lost much of its power because of 
privatization, presidential prerogative, and other circumventions (like the use of drone strikes 
facilitated by the C.I.A., a non-military branch of government).  The triumph of Neoconservative 
ideas and practices negated both the War Powers Resolution and the Abrams Doctrine, thus 
significantly shaping America‟s foreign policy for the last thirty years, and, perhaps, well into 
the future.   
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